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Abstract. Opinion dynamics is nowadays a very common field of research. In this article we
formulate and then study a novel, namely strategic perspective on such dynamics: There are
the usual ‘normal’ agents that update their opinions, for instance according the well-known
bounded confidence mechanism. But, additionally, there is at least one strategic agent. That
agent uses opinions as freely selectable strategies to get control on the dynamics: The strategic
agent of our benchmark problem tries, during a campaign of a certain length, to influence the
ongoing dynamics among normal agents with strategically placed opinions (one per period)
in such a way, that, by the end of the campaign, as much as possible normals end up with
opinions in a certain interval of the opinion space. Structurally, such a problem is an optimal
control problem. That type of problem is ubiquitous. Resorting to advanced and partly non-
standard methods for computing optimal controls, we solve some instances of the campaign
problem. But even for a very small number of normal agents, just one strategic agent, and
a ten-period campaign length, the problem turns out to be extremely difficult. Explicitly we
discuss moral and political concerns that immediately arise, if someone starts to analyze the
possibilities of an “optimal opinion control”.
1. Introduction
Since about 60 years the dynamics of opinions has been studied. Today it is a standard topic
of general conferences on agent-based modelling. A bunch of models were defined and analyzed.1
In the last 15 years at least hundreds and probably more than thousands of simulation studies
on the dynamics of opinions were published.2 The studies and their underlying models differ in
many details: The opinions and the underlying time are continuous or discrete, the updating
of opinions is governed by different updating regimes, the space of possible opinions may have
more than one dimension, the dynamics may run on this or that type of network, various types
of noise may be involved. But despite of all their differences there is a commonality in all these
studies and their models: The agents influence mutually their opinions, but they do not do that
strategically.
What is studied in the huge body of articles is typically focusing on convergence, dynamical
patterns or final structures. Given the specific parameters of the underlying model, the typical
questions are: Under what conditions does the dynamics stabilize? Does the dynamics lead
to consensus, polarisation, or other interesting types of clustering? What are the time scales
that are involved? What remains unasked in these studies are strategic questions like: Which
opinion should an agent pretend to have to drive the whole dynamics in his or her preferred
direction? Where in the opinion space should an agent ‘place’ an opinion, given that he or she
1For the general history of opinion dynamics see the introduction and for a partial classification see ch. 2 and 3
of the paper by Hegselmann & Krause (2002).
2There are several surveys encompassing various models of opinion dynamics (Acemoglu & Ozdaglar 2011;
Castellano et al. 2009; Liebrand et al. 1998; Stauffer 2005; Xia et al. 2011). A microfoundation for the evolution
of several opinion dynamics mechanisms is proposed and discussed by Groeber et al. (2014). – In subsection 1.3
we give specific hints to the related opinion dynamics literature that is directly relevant in the context of our
present article.
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has a certain preference with regard to the opinions in later periods. Our article deals with
such strategic questions. We develop a conceptual framework that allows to answer strategic
questions in certain cases. Additionally, we analyze why it is surprisingly difficult or impossible
to give exact answers to strategic questions even in cases that look very, very simple.
It is not by accident that strategic questions are normally not raised in the sort of research
that is labeled opinion dynamics. The standard approach is to describe the dynamics as a more
or less complicated dynamical system: There is a set I of agents 1, 2, . . . , i, j, . . . , n and a discrete
time t = 1, 2, . . .. The opinions of the agents are given by an opinion profile. This is a vector
xt = (xt1, . . . , x
t
n) that describes the state of the system at time t. Even if stated in an informal
or semi-formal way (sufficiently clear to program the process), the dynamics of the system is
basically given by a function f t that computes the state of the system xt+1 as xt+1 = f t(xt).
Thus, for each agent i the function f t specifies how xt+1i depends upon x
t. Depending upon
the specific opinion dynamics model, the vector valued functions f t work in very different ways.
For the most part they do some kind of averaging: averaging with a privileged weight for agent
i’s own opinion or a weighted averaging with weights wij that agent i assigns to agents j and
that are meant to express agent i’s respect for agent j, or some other sort of averaging subject
to constraints, for instance constraints in terms of network distance on an underlying network
on which the opinions dynamics is assumed to run.
Whatever the ‘story’ about f t, it is always a reactive process in which the agents react on the
last period t. In principle the step to t + 1 might depend upon some more past periods. But
even then, an answer to the question, where to place an opinion in order to drive the dynamics
in a preferred direction, requires something very different from looking into the past: It requires
anticipation, i.e., finding out what the future effects of placing an opinion here or there in the
opinion space probably are, and then placing it there, where the placement is most effective to
get to a preferred outcome.
In the following, we assume a setting in which we have two sets of agents: First, a set of
non-strategic agents as they are usually assumed in opinion dynamics. They are driven by the
function f t . The function describes a dynamical system in which the non-strategic agents always
reveal their ‘true’ actual opinion, take the opinions of others as their true actual opinion, and
mutually react on the given opinion profile xt according to f t(xt). The second set of agents is a
set of strategic agents. Whatever their true opinion may actually be, they can place any opinion
strategically in the opinion space where, then, non-strategic agents take these opinions at their
face values and consider them as revealed true opinions of other agents. The strategic agents
have preferences over possible opinion profiles of non-strategic agents. Therefore, they try to
place opinions in such a way that the opinion stream that is generated by f t is driven towards
the preferred type of profile.
Our setting has a structure as it is often perceived or even explicitly ‘conceptualized’ by
political or commercial campaigners: There is an ongoing opinion stream, result of and driven
by mutual exchange of opinions between communicating citizens, consumers, members of some
parliamentary body, etc. That opinion stream has its own dynamics. However, it is possible
to intervene: Using channels of all sorts (TV, radio, print media, mails, posters, adds, calls,
speeches, personal conversation, etc.) one can place opinions in the opinion space. Done in
an intelligent way, these interventions should drive the opinion stream in the direction of an
outcome that is preferred by the principal who pays a campaign. About that will often be the
self-understanding and selling-point of a campaigning agency.
The number of strategic agents matters: If there are two or more strategic agents, the setting
becomes a game theoretical context in which the strategic agents have to take into account that
there are others that try to influence the opinion dynamics as well. Therefore, the strategic
agents do not only ‘play a game’ with the non-strategic agents. They play also – and that now
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in an exact game theoretical sense of the word – a game against each other. It is a complicated
game for which in principle usual solution concepts like the (sub-game perfect) Nash equilibrium
can be applied. But if there is just one strategic agent, then there are no other competing players.
That turns the problem of the strategic agent into the following question: How can one place
opinions in an ongoing opinion stream (governed by f t) in such a way that the stream moves
as much as possible in the direction of one’s favorite profile? This task means to optimize of
decisions over time. Technically speaking, problems of this type are optimal control problems.
As soon as a mathematical formalization is available, there are various mathematical methods
to find solutions.
The topic of this paper is the optimal control problem of a strategic agent who tries to influence
a certain ongoing opinion dynamics. As a benchmark problem for such an agent, we define what
we call the campaign problem: The strategic agent tries to control an opinion dynamics, such
that in a certain period, known in advance, there are as much as possible opinions of normal
agents in a certain interval of the opinion space. That covers many types of voting or buying
campaigns. We will investigate the campaign problem by various methods. Our focus will always
be on understanding basic features of the problem—and that will be difficult enough. Some
elementary mathematical proofs will give some theoretical insights into structural properties.
With models from mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) we will try to directly solve our
central optimization problem. This way we can solve some instances of the campaign problem,
but – surprisingly – not all. Therefore we will additionally attack the control problem by heuristic
methods. An additional investigation using genetic algorithms provides evidence for the fact that
‘good’ controls are almost impossible to find by randomized exploration.
1.1. Moral and political concerns. Our question and approach immediately raises moral
and political concerns: Over the last years we learnt that there are well equipped agencies that
(among other things) aim at a more or less complete supervision of private and public opinions.
Isn’t the title of our paper at least a partial confession, that now, as a kind of additional thread,
basic research on strategies for an efficient manipulation of public opinion formation is put on
the agenda, isn’t our ‘control terminology’ a tell-tale language?
This is a very serious question and a very serious concern. An answer requires careful con-
sideration of least six aspects: First, the only means of opinion ‘control’ is publically stating an
opinion. Second, campaigning can be done for both, good and bad purposes: Information, en-
lightenment, spreading the truth, or desinformation, confusion, spreading liars. Third, whoever
plans a campaign for a good purpose will immediately get into serious optimization problems.
For an example, let’s assume that measles vaccination is basically a good thing. From a public
health point of view, a certain minimum vaccination rate is necessary and a certain upper rate
sufficient. In the US, Germany, and other countries the actual vaccination rates are too low.
Therefore public health institutions design pro vaccination campaigns. In doing so, important
questions are: On which parts of the networks of vaccination skeptics and enemies should one
concentrate to what degree, or in what sequence? What might convince which parts of the net-
works to change their opinions? Which opinion changes can be induced in the network? – All
these questions are questions about an optimal campaign, given one’s constraints (in terms of
budget, time, channels, arguments, their effects on whom, and chances to confront people with
them etc.). Fourth, our control terminology is the usual terminology in the disciplines, theories,
and tool box approaches that can be used to solve optimization problems of all sorts. Our cam-
paign problem is just an instance. The spirit of these approaches is technical: One has some
constrained means to influence something to some degree in a certain, more or less attractive
direction. What, then, is an optimal use of one’s means?—that is the guiding question. The
question is neutral as to ends, except for optimality itself (and some more formal consistency
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requirements). The possibility of a ‘dual use’ is inherent to such approaches. Fifth, in what fol-
lows our strategic agents place their opinions independent of any truth considerations. They try
to influence the ongoing opinion dynamics in their favorite direction by placing an opinion here
or there in the opinion space. Only the effects matter. Therefore, one might say, our strategic
agents are completely opportunistic. Under a less pejorative description we might consider them
as perfect diplomats that know how to overcome entrenched opinions. If we consider diplomacy
or opportunism as morally unacceptable, then we could formulate a corresponding moral con-
straint: We could require to place only opinions that are close to one’s true actual opinion, and
we specify ‘close’ by a certain threshold for the maximal acceptable distance of placed opinions
to one’s own actual opinion. Probably nobody would advocate a threshold of zero.3 But, then,
one should also recognize, that for any such non-zero-threshold, there still exists the control
problem of how to design an optimal campaign (though with an additional constraint). Finally,
dual use concerns about an optimal control approach to opinion dynamics are justified, of course.
The existence of professional disinformation agencies is not an invention of conspiracy theorists.
They are at work, they have their secret expertise – and, in all likelihood, they learn. But
exactly because of that there has to be public knowledge about what can be done in terms of
optimal campaigning – and that for both, good and bad purposes. The first type of knowledge
is supportive, the second protective. Helpful are both.
1.2. Our benchmark: The campaign problem. To specify the campaign problem we add
just one strategic agent0 to the set of agents. Agent0 is equipped with the ability to freely
choose in any time step what other agents then perceive as his or her opinion. We call agent0 the
controller and his freely chosen opinion the control. Mathematically, this makes the development
of the opinion system dependent on exogenously chosen parameters, namely the control opinion,
and we are faced with a control system. If we define what the controller wants to achieve, we
can formulate an optimal control problem, for which the controller tries to find the controls to
get there.
Our optimal control problem is of a specific – seemingly simple – type: Agent0 can strategically
place opinions in a finite sequence of periods, one and only one opinion per period. There is the
ongoing and underlying opinion dynamics, given by a function f t. Period by period agent0 tries
to do the placement of an opinion in such a way that finally in a certain future time step N (the
horizon), known in advance, something is maximized: the number of normal agents’ opinions
that are in a certain part of the opinion space that ex ante was specified by agent0. To keep
it simple, we assume as a special one-dimensional opinion space the real-valued unit interval
[0, 1]. As the part of the opinion space preferred by the controller, we assume a target interval
[`, r] ⊆ [0, 1] for some prescribed ` < r in [0, 1] known to the controller.
Both assumptions are much less restrictive than they seem to be: First, the unit interval can be
used to represent opinions about, for example, tax rates, minimal wages, maximum salaries, po-
litical positions on a left-right spectrum, product quality, or any property whatsoever that can be
expressed by real-valued numbers. If – and often that will be the case – the ‘really’ possible range
of numerical values is different from the unit interval, then some transformation, approximation,
or range regarding guess work is necessary. But that is an easy and widely accepted step (at
least in principle). Second, suppose there are m fixed alternatives a = (a1, a2, . . . , am) ∈ [0, 1]m,
sorted such that a1 ≤ a2 ≤ . . . ≤ am. Further suppose, our n normal agents have to choose
among the alternatives at the future time step N and and will do that by choosing an alternative
that is next to their own opinion in that time step. What, then, is the problem of a controller
3 Imagine, I use a hypothetical argument that I myself do not share. Nevertheless, in other persons’ opinions
this may induce a change in the direction of what I consider the truth. What is morally wrong with such a
discussion strategy?
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with the interest to make as much normal agents as possible choosing a certain alternative aj?
Obviously the problem is to maximize the number of agents’ opinions that in time step N are
within a certain interval to the left and to the right of the favored alternative aj . The exact
bounds of that interval depend upon the exact positions of the two nearest alternatives aj−1
to the left and aj+1 to the right of the favored aj . The exact left and rights bounds are then
aj−1+aj
2 and
aj+aj+1
2 respectively.
Therefore, whatever the vector of alternatives may be (e.g., positions of parties or candidates
on a left/right scale, a price or a technical specification of a certain type of product), whenever
there are voting or buying decisions4 after a foregoing opinion dynamics (e.g., about the appropri-
ate position in the political spectrum, the acceptable price or a desirable technical specification
of some product), our controller agent0 who tries to ‘sell’ a certain alternative aj as effectively
as possible, has always the same problem: How to get by period N as many opinions as possible
within a certain target interval [`, r], determined by the closest left and right competitors of aj?
– Obviously, our framework and setup is much more general than it looks at a first glance.
1.3. The underlying opinion dynamics: A linear and a non-linear version. Our problem
and approach presupposes an underlying opinion dynamics given by a function f t. But there
are many. We will use a linear and a non-linear variant, each of them probably being the most
prominent variant of their type.
In the linear variant, the opinion dynamics is driven by weighted averaging : Weights wij may
express the respect or competence that an agent i assigns to an agent j; alternatively, a weight
wij may express the influence, impact or power that agent j has on agent i. The weights that
an agent assigns sum up to one. The opinion space is the unit interval [0, 1]. – The history
of this linear system goes back to French Jr (1956), it has been already presented by Harary
(1959), it was explicitly stated by DeGroot (1974), and it received a lot of attention, especially
in philosophy, through the book by Lehrer & Wagner (1981).5 We will refer to that model as
the DeGroot-model (DG-model).6
The non-linear variant that we will use is the so called bounded confidence model (BC-model).
In this model the agents take seriously those others whose opinion are not too far away from
their own opinion: The agents have a certain confidence radius  and update their opinions – the
opinion space is again the unit interval [0, 1] – by averaging over all opinions that are from their
own opinion not further away than : An agent i updates to xt+1i by averaging over the elements
of the set
{
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . n} ∣∣ |xti − xtj | ≤ }, i.e., over all the opinions that are within what is
called his or her confidence interval. The model was defined by Krause (1997), in 1998 it was
coined bounded confidence model (Krause 2000), and then for the first time, to a certain extent,
4It may even be a buying decision in the metaphorical sense of whether or not to ‘buy’ a certain assumption:
Imagine a committee that after some discussion has to decide whether to proceed based on this or that assumption
in a vector a of alternatives.
5Lehrer & Wagner (1981) do not interpret the iterated weighted averaging as a process in time. As stressed
by Hegselmann & Krause (2006, p. 4): “Their starting point is a ‘dialectical equilibrium’, i.e., a situation after,
the group has engaged in extended discussion of the issue so that all empirical data and theoretical ratiocination
has been communicated. ‘. . . the discussion has sufficiently exhausted the scientific information available so that
further discussion would not change the opinion of any member of the group’ ((Lehrer & Wagner 1981, p. 19)).
The central question for Lehrer and Wagner then is: Once the dialectical equilibrium is reached, is there a rational
procedure to aggregate the normally still divergent opinions in the group (cf. (Lehrer 1981, p. 229)? Their answer
is ‘Yes.’ The basic idea for the procedure is to make use of the fact that normally we all do not only have opinions
but also information on expertise or reliability of others. That information can be used to assign weights to
other individuals. The whole aggregation procedure is then iterated weighted averaging with t → ∞ and based
on constant weights. It is shown that for lots of weight matrices the individuals reach a consensus whatever the
initial opinions might be – if they only were willing to apply the proposed aggregation procedure.”
6In philosophy the model is often called the Lehrer-Wagner model.
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comprehensively analyzed, by both simulations and rigorous analytical means, by Hegselmann
& Krause (2002).
The model looks extremely simple. However, there are several warnings in the literature on the
BC-model, among them a very recent one: “The update rule . . . is certainly simple to formulate,
though the simplicity is deceptive” (Wedin & Hegarty 2014, p. 2). The authors’ warning is well
founded: The simple update rule generates a complicated dynamics that still is only partially
understood. The main reason for that is this: The updating rule of the BC-model can be
described as assigning weights to other agents. All agents with opinions out of the confidence
interval get a weight of 0; agents within get a weight of 1 divided by the number of agents that are
within the interval. Therefore, the BC-dynamics is weighted averaging as well. However, there
is a crucial difference to the linear DG-model: The weights of the BC-model are time-dependent
and, even worse, discontinuously dependent on the current profile. That causes a lot of trouble
– and, at the same time, generates many of interesting effects. As a consequence, the BC-model
became a subject for all sorts of analytical or computational analysis and a starting point for
extensions of all sorts. The body of literature on the BC-model is correspondingly huge.
Structural results in the BC-model were obtained with respect to convergence and its rate
(Dittmer 2001; Krause 2006; Lorenz 2006), thresholds for the confidence radius (Fortunato
2005b), the identification of the really crucial topological and metric structures (Krause 2006),
or the influence of the underlying network (Weisbuch 2004). The influence of a ‘true’ opinion, to
which (some of) the individuals are attracted, received special attention (Hegselmann & Krause
2006; Malarz 2006; Douven & Riegler 2010; Douven & Kelp 2011; Kurz & Rambau 2011; Wen-
mackers et al. 2012, 2014). With a grain of salt, the true opinion can also be interpreted as a
control that is constant over time and that is contained in each individual’s confidence interval.
Many variants of the original BC-model (discrete time, finitely many individuals, continuous
opinion space) have been proposed, among them pairwise sequential updating (Deffuant et al.
2000), a discrete opinion space (Fortunato 2004), a multi-dimensional opinion space (Fortunato
et al. 2005; Krause 2005), a noisy opinion space (Bhattacharyya et al. 2013; Pineda et al. 2013),
a continuous distribution instead of a finite-dimensional vector of opinions (Lorenz 2005, 2007),
continuous time (Blondel et al. 2010), and a continuum of agents (Wedin & Hegarty 2014).
Alternative dynamics have been enhanced with BC-type features by several authors (Stauffer
2002, 2003; Fortunato 2005; Stauffer & Sahimi 2006; Rodrigues & Da F.Costa 2005) in order to
make the resulting emergent effects more interesting.
It is interesting to note that simulations play an important role in the investigation of the
innocent-looking models for opinion dynamics (Stauffer 2003; Hegselmann & Krause 2006; Fortu-
nato & Stauffer 2006; Stauffer & Sahimi 2006) – a hint that some aspects of opinion dynamics are
very hard to deduce purely theoretically. The arguably most general account of theoretical as-
pects was contributed by Chazelle on the basis of a completely new methodology around function
theoretical arguments (Chazelle 2011). Moreover, opinion dynamics in multi-agent systems can
be seen as an instance of influence system – this broader context is also described by (Chazelle
2012).
Carletti et al. (2006) study the influence of a given, fixed exogenous propaganda opinion on the
Deffuant-Weisbuch opinion dynamics. However, the problem of optimally choosing a propaganda
opinion is not considered. Implicitly, the control of opinion dynamics started out from gaining
control over the communication structure (Lorenz & Urbig 2007) or additional system parameters
(Lorenz 2008). Recently, the effect of time-varying exogenous influences on the consensus process
has been studied by Mirtabatabaei et al. (2014). Kurz (submitted) investigated how the time
to stabilization changes if controlled opinions enter the scene. For the first time to the best of
our knowledge, the notion of opinion control appeared literally only in the title of a paper by
Zuev & Fedyanin (2012), based on a different dynamical model, though. For continuous time
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optimal control techniques have been applied to opinion consensus, exemplarily also for the BC-
dynamics, in the preprint by Albi et al. (2014). Closest to our research is, up to now, probably
the investigation by Fortunato (2005a) about so-called damage spreading: what happens if some
of the opinions in a BC-model change erratically and possibly drastically? The setting in that
paper, however, has not been utilized to find in some sense ‘optimal damages’, i.e., some that
lead to an outcome that is most desirable among all possible outcomes.
1.4. Specification of the campaign problem for the DG- and the BC-model. In what
follows, we analyze our optimal control problem with the linear DG- and the non-linear BC-model
as the underlying opinion dynamics that agent0 tries to control: Given the DG- or BC-dynamics
and using the controls, i.e., placing one opinion per period here or there in the opinion space,
agent0 tries to maximize the number of agents with opinions that in a future period N are in
a certain target interval [`, r] – and therefore would ‘buy’ the corresponding alternative aj that
agent0 is actually campaigning for. – In the following, we will switch to a more vivid language
fitting this interpretation: agents are called voters, the special agent0 is called the controller, the
target interval [`, r] is called the conviction interval, and voters in the target interval are called
convinced voters.
As an example, we will analyze a specific instance of the campaign problem: There are 11
voters, governed by a DG- or BC-version of the (reactive) function f t. At t = 0, the 11 voters
start with the opinions 0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9, 1. The confidence radius is given by  = 0.15 and the
conviction interval is [0.375, 0.625]. That conviction interval would be the target in a campaign
in which the alternatives 14 ,
1
2 ,
3
4 are competing and
1
2 is the preferred alternative. The goal is
to maximize the number of convinced voters, i.e., those with opinions in the conviction interval,
in a certain future period N with N = 1, 2, . . . , 10. The benchmark problem looks like a baby
problem. But it is a monster: It will turn out that for higher one digit values of N we could not
solve it by the most sophisticated methods available.7
More specifically, we will see, that even for this innocent-looking example we were not able
to find the optimal number of convinced voters for all numbers of stages between 1 and 10. In
Table 1 we summarize our results on the benchmark campaign problem in this paper. In the rest
of the paper we will explain in detail how we obtained that knowledge.
1.5. Stucture of this Paper. In what follows, we
• define exactly the new problem optimal opinion control8 and an example instance of it,
the benchmark campaign problem, for illustration and test purposes,
• develop two exact mathematical models based on mixed integer linear programming to
characterize optimal controls9,
• devise three classes of primal heuristics (combinatorial tailor-made, meta-heuristics,
model predictive control) to find good controls,
• present computational results on all methods applied to our benchmark problem,
• sketch possible lines of future research.
In Section 2 we formally introduce the optimal opinion control problem. Section 3 shows
what can happen if the pitfalls of numerical mathematics are ignored in computer simulations.
7These values were chosen in a research seminar because they looked very simple and came to our mind first.
We were convinced that we would solve all related problems very fast by whatever method and could start to
worry about more serious problem sizes. We were wrong. It is still this innocent-looking benchmark campaign
problem that determines the agenda, as we will see.
8During finalizing work on this paper, it came to our attention that optimal opinion control was independently
introduced and investigated with a different objective in continuous time by Wongkaew et al. (to appear)
9Another application of mixed integer linear programming techniques in modeling social sciences was, e.g.,
presented by Kurz (2012).
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# stages # convincable voters
lower bound∗ upper bound∗∗
0 3 3
1 3 3
2 4 4
3 5 5
4 5 5
5 6 6
6 6 6
7 8 11
8 8 11
9 8 11
10 11 11
Table 1. The optimal number of convinced voters in the benchmark example
lies between the given lower and upper bounds, depending on the number of
stages; we will explain in in Sections 6∗ and 5∗∗ how we obtained this informa-
tion.
Section 4 presents some structural knowledge about optimal controls in small special cases,
thereby indicating that a general theoretical solution of the optimal control problem is not
very likely. Computational results are presented in Section 5. The detailed presentation of the
underlying exact mathematical models is postponed to Appendix A, followed by information
on the parameter settings for the commercial solver we used in Appendix B. Our heuristics are
introduced in Section 6. In Section 7 we interpret the obtained results. Conclusions and further
directions can be found in Section 8.
2. Modeling the Dynamics of Opinions and Their Control
We will now formalize the ideas sketched so far. In this paper, we will restrict ourselves to the
arguably simplest case where an opinion of a voter i ∈ I can be represented by a real number xi
in the unit interval [0, 1].
The opinions may change over time subject to a certain system dynamics: We assume that
time is discretized into stages T := {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}. The opinion of voter i ∈ I in stage t ∈ T is
denoted by xti. We call, as usual, the vector x
t := (xti)i∈I the state of the system in stage t. The
system dynamics f t is a vector valued function that computes the state of the system xt+1 as
xt+1 := f t(xt). We assume a given start value xstarti for the current opinion of each voter i ∈ I.
Thus, x0i = x
start
i holds for all i ∈ I.
Depending on how f t is defined, we obtain different models of opinion dynamics. In this
paper, we will only consider so-called stationary models, where f t does not depend on the stage t.
Therefore, from now on, we will drop the superscript t from the notation and write f for the
system dynamics.
2.1. The DeGroot Model. In this model, each voter is again in contact with each other in
every stage. The strengths of the influences of opinions on other opinions are given by non-
negative weights wij with
∑
j∈I wij = 1 for all i ∈ I, with the meaning that the opinion of
voter i is influenced by the opinion of voter j with weight wij . The mathematical formulation of
this is to define f = (fi)i∈I as a weighted arithmetic mean in the following way:
fi(x1, . . . , xn) :=
∑
j∈I
wijxj . (1)
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It can be shown that this, in the limit, leads to consensus.10 It leads, as we will see below,
still to an interesting optimal control problem.
2.2. The Bounded-Confidence Model. The motivation for this model is that our voters
ignore too distant opinions of others. Formally, we fix once and for all voters and stages an
 ∈ (0, 1), and each voter is influenced only by opinions that are no more than  away from his
or her own opinion. We call [xti − , xti + ] ∩ [0, 1] the confidence interval of voter i in stage t.
Let the confidence set Ii(x1, . . . , xn) of voter i ∈ I in state x = (x1, . . . , xn) be defined as
Ii(x1, . . . , xn) := {j ∈ I : |xj − xi| ≤ } . (2)
Observe that Ii(x1, . . . , xn) 6= ∅ due to i ∈ Ii(x1, . . . , xn).
Then the system dynamics of the BC-model is given as follows:
fi(x1, . . . , xn) :=
1
|Ii(x1, . . . , xn)|
∑
j∈Ii(x1,...,xn)
xj . (3)
A possible extension might be a stochastic disturbance on , but, as we will see, bounded-
confidence is still far from being completely understood. Therefore, in this paper bounded
confidence will be in the main focus.
2.3. A New Opinion Control Model. Given a dynamical system as above, we can of course
think about the possibility of a control that can influence the system dynamics. Formally, this
means that the system dynamics f depends also on some additional exogenously provided data
u, the control.
Formally, this means in the simplest case (and we will restrict to this case) that the controller
can present an additional opinion ut in every stage that takes part in the opinion dynamics. The
corresponding system dynamics, taking the control as an additional argument, are then given as
follows (with x0 := u and I0 := I ∪ {0} as well as wij this time with
∑
j∈I0 wij = 1 for easier
notation):
fi(x0;x1, . . . , xn) :=
∑
j∈I0
wijxj , (DeGroot-Control)
fi(x0;x1, . . . , xn) :=
1
|Ii(x0, x1, . . . , xn)|
∑
j∈Ii(x0,x1,...,xn)
xj . (Bounded-Confidence-Control)
We can interpret this as a usual model of opinion dynamics with an additional opinion x0 that
can be positioned freely in every stage by the controller. The aim of the controller is as follows:
Control opinions in a way such that after N stages there are as many opinions as possible in a
given interval [`, r] ⊆ [0, 1].
To formalize this, fix an interval [`, r] (the conviction interval), and let the conviction set
J(x1, . . . , xn) denote the set of all voters j ∈ I with xj ∈ [`, r]. We want to maximize the number
of convinced voters. Thus, the problem we want to investigate is the following deterministic
10This is an easy consequence of the Banach Fixed Point Theorem, since this dynamics is a contraction.
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discrete-time optimal control problem:
max
x00,x
1
0,...,x
N−1
0
|J(xN1 , . . . , xNn )|
subject to
x0i = x
start
i ∀i ∈ I, (Start Configuration)
xt+1i = fi(x
t
0;x
t
1, . . . , x
t
n) ∀i ∈ I, t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, (System Dynamics)
xt0 ∈ [0, 1] ∀t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, (Control Restrictions)
where f = (fi)i∈I is one of the controlled system dynamics in Equations (DeGroot-Control)
and (Bounded-Confidence-Control), resp.
3. Simulation and Pitfalls from Numerical Mathematics
No matter what we do: a computer can represent only finitely many distinct numbers. Thus,
it is impossible that a computer can distinguish infinitely many numbers like there exist in [0, 1].
Even worse: if a number type is used for computer programming that uses a fixed number of
bits, i.e., zeros and ones in the binary representation, like “float” or “double”, then distinct real
numbers that are very close can be interpreted as identical numbers by the computer. This
has a serious influence on our ability to check correctly whether or not one opinion is in the
confidence interval of another whenever this is a cutting-edge decision. More specifically: If we
try to solve our benchmark problem for the BC-model, the computer has – again and again –
to decide the question whether or not |xi − xj | ≤ , where xi, xj , and  are, in particular, real
numbers. For a human being with a tiny bit of math training it is easy to answer the question
whether |0.6 − 0.4| ≤ 0.2. If a computer has to answer that simple question and uses what in
some programming languages is called the data format “real” or “float” or even “double” (float
with double precision), then the computer might get it wrong. In Figure 1, left, one can see
that effect: We start the dynamics with 6 voters that are regularly distributed at the positions
0, 0.2, 0.4, . . . , 1. The confidence radius  is 0.2.11 Obviously the computer (using a program
written in Delphi, but in NetLogo the analogous mistake would happen, possibly somewhere else)
answers the question whether |0.6− 0.4| ≤ 0.2 in a wrong way. As a consequence, from the first
update onwards the dynamics is corrupted: Given our start distribution and the homogeneous,
constant, and symmetric confidence radius, the opinion stream should be mirror symmetric with
respect to a horizontal line at y = 0.5. That symmetry is forever destroyed by the very first
update. What happens here is no accident. It is the necessary consequence of the floating point
arithmetic that computers use to approximate real numbers. Using floating point arithmetic
each number is represented with a finite number of binary digits, so a small error is possibly
made. For a hard decision like |xi − xj | ≤  or |xi − xj | >  a small error is sufficient to draw
the wrong conclusion, whenever |xi − xj | equals or is rather close to . The only way for us to
cope with this problem is to resort to exact rational arithmetics throughout, although there may
be more sophisticated methods to improve efficiency. This numerical instability has the more
serious consequence that of-the-shelf optimization algorithms with floating point arithmetics can
not be used without checking the results for correctness in exact arithmetics.12
11The number 0.2 is tricky because its binary representation as a floating point number is determined by
0.2 = 1
8
+ 1
16
+ 1
128
+ 1
256
+ . . . = 0.00112, i.e., its exact representation would need infinitely many bits. For
example, a cutoff bit representation would be identical to a smaller number than 0.2. Thus, checking whether or
not some number is smaller or larger than 0.2 checks this question not for 0.2 but for a smaller number. How
exactly 0.2 is finitely represented in a computer is usually defined by an IEEE standard.
12Polhill et al. (2005) demonstrate that, based upon floating-point numbers, in several agent-based models
branching statements lead to severe numerical artefacts.
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Using exact arithmetic we obtain that the opinions of our voters are given by
x0 = (0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0),
x1 = (0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9),
x2 = (0.15, 0.23, 0.4, 0.6, 0.76, 0.85),
x3 = (0.1916, 0.261, 0.41, 0.58, 0.738, 0.8083)
=
(
23
120
,
47
180
,
37
90
,
53
90
,
133
180
,
97
120
)
,
x4 =
(
163
720
,
311
1080
,
227
540
,
313
540
,
769
1080
,
557
720
)
,
x5 =
(
673
2160
,
673
2160
,
3271
8640
,
5369
8640
,
1487
2160
,
1487
2160
)
,
x6 =
(
577
1728
,
577
1728
,
577
1728
,
1151
1728
,
1151
1728
,
1151
1728
)
=
(
0.333912037, 0.333912037, 0.333912037, 0.666087962,
0.666087962, 0.666087962
)
.
The corresponding correct trajectory is drawn on the right hand side of Figure 1.
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Figure 1. A computational disaster caused by a tiny inaccuracy (left: numer-
ical artefact; right: correct result)
As we have seen, a small error in the positions of the voters, computational or by observation,
can have a drastic effect. We mention that this effect can not happen for numerical stable
dynamics like, e.g., the DG-model. The only patch that came to our mind which was capable of
dealing with the numerical instability was to use exact arithmetic. This means that we represent
all numbers as fractions where the numerator and the denominator are integers with unlimited
accuracy. We remark that we have used the Class Library of Numbers (CLN) a C++-package,
but similar packages should be available also for other programming languages.
There are quite a lot of articles dealing with the simulation of the BC-model. To our knowledge
none of these mentioned the use of exact arithmetic. So one could assume that the authors have
used ordinary floating point numbers with limited precision for there considerations. It is an
interesting question whether all of these obtained results remain more or less the same if being
recalculated with exact arithmetic. For no existing publication, however, we found any evidence
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that the conclusions are only artefacts of numerical trouble. For results using randomized starting
configurations the probability is zero that the distance between agents equals the confidence
radius. In those experiments numerical artifacts are much less likely (though not impossible)
than in simulations starting from equidistant configurations.
We have to admit, that in the starting phase of our investigation in optimal control of opinion
dynamics, we have also used floating point arithmetic. We heuristically found controls achieving
10 voters after 10 stages. Using exact arithmetic it turned out that the computed control yields
only 4 convinced voters, which is a really bad control, as we will see later on.
4. Basic Structural Properties of Optimal Controls
In this section we collect some basic facts about structural properties of optimal controls,
mainly for the BC-model. While generally the DG-model has nicer theoretical properties, there
is an exception when considering the ordering of the voters over time.
Lemma 4.1. (Cf. (Krause 2000, Lemma 2).) Consider an instance of the BC-model (with
control or without).
(1) If xti = x
t
j, then x
t+1
i = x
t+1
j .
(2) If xti ≤ xtj, then xt+1i ≤ xt+1j .
Proof. If the positions of voter i and voter j coincide at stage t, then they have identical confidence
sets and the system dynamics yields the same positions for i and j at stage t + 1. For (2), we
assume xti < x
t
j w.l.o.g. We set C = Ii(x
t
1, . . . , x
t
n) ∩ Ij(xt1, . . . , xtn), L = Ii(xt1, . . . , xtn)\C, and
R = Ij(x
t
1, . . . , x
t
n)\C. Due to xti < xtj we have xtl < xtc < xtr for all l ∈ L, c ∈ C, and r ∈ R.
Thus xt+1i ≤ xt+1j . 
The analogous statement for the DG-model is wrong in general.
Next we observe that one or usually a whole set of optimal controls exists. The number of
convinced voters is in any stage trivially bounded from above by the total number of voters |I|.
Hence, to every control there corresponds a bounded integer valued number of convinced voters.
With some technical effort an explicit bound can be computed.
First, we observe that there are some boundary effects. Consider a single voter with start
value x01 =
1
2 and  =
1
2 . Further suppose that the conviction interval is given by [0, δ], where δ
is small. The most effective way to move the opinion of voter 1 towards 0 is to place a control
at 0 at each stage. With this we obtain xt1 =
1
2t+1 for all t. Thus the time when voters 1 can be
convinced depends on the length δ of the conviction interval. This is due to the fact that we can
not place the control at xt1−  if xt1 is too close to the boundary. The same reasoning applies for
the other boundary at 1. In order to ease the exposition and the technical notation we assume
that no opinion is near to the boundaries in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Consider an instance of the BC-model such that the start values and the conviction
interval [l, r] are contained in [, 1− ]. It is possible to select suitable controls at each stage such
that after at most 2n+1 + 2 stages all |I| voters are convinced.
Proof. We will proceed in two steps. In the first step we ensure that all voters have the same
opinion after a certain amount of stages. In the second step we will move the coinciding opinions
inside the conviction interval.
Without loss of generality, we assume the ordering x01 ≤ · · · ≤ x0n and observe x0n−x01 ≤ 1−2.
If xtn − xt1 > , we place a control at xt1 +  < xtn. As an abbreviation we set R = I1(xt1, . . . , xtn).
At most n − 1 of the n voters can be inside the confidence set of voter 1, i.e., |R| ≤ n − 1, and
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we have xti ≥ xt1 for all i ∈ R, see Lemma 4.1. With this we conclude
xt+11 =
1
|R|+ 1 ·
(
xt0 +
∑
i∈R
xti
)
≥ 1|R|+ 1 ·
(
xt1 + +
∑
i∈R
xt1
)
= xt1 +

|R|+ 1 ≥ x
t
1 +

n
.
After at most n · (⌈ 1 ⌉− 3) ≤ n stages we can achieve xtn − xt1 ≤ . Then placing the control at
xt1+x
t
n
2 yields the same opinion, which is also inside [, 1 − ], for all voters after at most n + 1
stages, i.e., the first step is completed.
In Step 2 we proceed as follows. If xt1 ∈ [l, r] nothing needs to be done. Due to symmetry we
assume xt1 < l in the following. If l−xt1 ≥ n+1 we place a control at xt1+ so that xt+11 = xt1+ n+1 ,
since all voters influence voter 1. After at most (n+ 1) stages we have l− xt1 < n+1 . In such a
situation we set the control to xt1 + (n+ 1)(l − xt1) such that xt+11 = l.
Applying Lemma 4.1 again, we conclude that we can achieve xti = l after at most
2n+1
 + 2 for
all i ∈ I. Taking the control as xti we can clearly preserve the configuration to later stages. 
Thus, given enough time (number of stages) we could always achieve the upper bound of |I|
convinced voters. By setting [l, r] = [1 − , 1 − ] and x0i = , we see that the stated estimation
gives the right order of magnitude in the worst case.
For the DG-model the upper bound on the time needed to convince all voters depends on the
influence wi0 of the control for each voter. To this end we define ω = mini∈I wi0, i.e., the tightest
possible lower bound on the influences. Since it may happen that no stable state is reached after
a finite number of stages, we can only navigate the voters into an interval of length greater than
zero.
Lemma 4.3. Consider an instance of the DG-model with 0 < ω = mini∈I wi0 < 1, δ ∈ (0, 1),
and a position p ∈ [0, 1]. It is possible to select suitable controls at each stage such that after at
most log(δ)log(1−ω) stages all |I| voters have an opinion within the interval [p− δ, p+ δ].
Proof. By induction over t we prove that we have |xti − p| ≤ (1−ω)t for all i ∈ I and t ∈ N, if we
place the control at position p at all stages. Since xti, p ∈ [0, 1] we have
∣∣x0i − p∣∣ ≤ (1− ω)0 = 1
for all i ∈ I. For t ≥ 1 we have
xti =
∑
j∈I
wij · xt−1j + wi0 · p ≥
∑
j∈I
wij ·
(
p− (1− ω)t−1) + wi0 · p
≥ (1− ω) · (p− (1− ω)t−1)+ ω · p = p− (1− ω)t
for all i ∈ I. Similarly we conclude xti ≤ p+ (1− ω)t. 
Thus, given enough time (number of stages) we could always achieve the upper bound of |I|
convinced voters if the conviction interval has a length greater than zero. By setting p = 1 and
x0i = 0, we see that the stated estimation gives the right order of magnitude in the worst case.
Using the Taylor expansion of log(1−ω) and having an influence that decreases with the number
of voters in mind, we remark that
log(δ)
log
(
1− 1n+1
) ≤ −(n+ 1) · log(δ).
5. Computational Information on Optimal Controls
How can one find reliable information on optimal controls and their resulting optimal achieve-
ments? That is, for a special instance like our benchmark instance, how can we find out, how
many convinced voters are achievable for a given horizon N? It is certainly not possible to try
all possible controls and pick the best – there are uncountably infinitely many feasible controls,
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because all elements in [0, 1]N constitute feasible controls. On the other hand, some logical con-
straints are immediate without enumeration: it is impossible to achieve more convinced voters
than there are voters.
A common technique to supersede such a trivial statement without complete enumeration is
to devise a mathematical model and find solutions to it by exact methods. Exact methods depend
on generic logical reasoning or provably correct computational information about the solution of
a mathematical model.13 In this section, we use mixed integer linear programming (MILP) for
modeling the DG and the BC optimal control problems and cplex for solving them, see Table 11
for the precise parameter settings.
While the models are generically correct, concrete computational results will only be given
for our benchmark problem and related data. One big advantage of MILP models is that there
is commercial software of-the-shelf that can provide solutions to such models regardless of what
they represent. There is even academic free software that is able to provide solutions stunningly
fast.
In this section, we will not spell out the formulae of our models explicitly.14 Instead, we try
to emphasize the features of our approach.
First, an optimal solution to an MILP model is globally optimal. That is, no better solution
exists anywhere in the solution space. Second, if an optimal solution to an MILP model was
reported by the solver software, we are sure (within the bounds of numerical accuracy) that it is
an optimal solution, i.e., the method is exact. Third, if an optimal solution to an MILP could not
be found in reasonable time, then very often we still obtain bounds on the value of an (otherwise
unknown) optimal solution. And fourth, as usual the process of constructing an MILP model is
non-unique, i.e., usually there are many, substantially different options to build an MILP model
for the same problem, and one may provide solutions faster or for larger instances than another.
We built an MILP model for the DG optimal control problem and two MILP models for the
(much more difficult) BC optimal control problem.
5.1. Principle Ideas of the MILP models. The MILP model for the DG optimal control
problem can be classified as a straight-forward MILP: the system dynamics is linear and fits
therefore the modeling paradigm of MILP very well. The only little complication is to model
the number of convinced voters, which is a non-linear, non-continuous function of the voters’
opinions. Since binary variables are allowed in MILP, we can construct such functions in many
cases using the so-called “Big-M method.” Details are described in the Appendix A.1.
An MILP model for the BC optimal control problem is not straight-forward at all. Since
the system dynamics depends on whether or not some voter is in the confidence interval of
another, we have to decide at some point whether or not two voters’ distance is either ≤  or
> . It is another general feature that strict inequalities cause trouble for MILP modeling, and
the distinction would be numerically unstable anyway (most MILP solvers use floating-point
arithmetic, see Section 3). Thus, we refrained from trying to build a correct MILP model for
the BC optimal control problem. Instead, we built two complementary MILP models. Without
referring to the details, we again explain only the features. In the first MILP model, the lower-
bound model, any feasible solution defines a feasible control, which achieves, when checked with
exact arithmetic, at least as many convinced voters as predicted in the MILP model. The second
MILP model, the dual model, is some kind of relaxation: No control can convince more voters
than the number of convinced voters predicted for any of its optimal solutions.
13An example of generic logical reasoning can be seen in the previous section.
14Mathematically explicit descriptions, suitable for replicating our results, can be found in Appendix A in the
appendix.
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This is implemented by using a safety margin ˆ for the confidence interval. In the models,
it is now required for any feasible control that it leads, at all times, to differences between any
pair of voters that are either ≤  or ≥  + ˆ. If ˆ > 0, we obtain a lower-bound model, since
some originally feasible controls are excluded because they lead to differences between voters
that are too close to the confidence radius . If ˆ ≤ 0, we obtain an upper-bound model where
the requirements for “are within distance ” and “are at distance at least + ˆ” overlap so that
the solution with better objective function value can be chosen by the solver software.
Now, if we put together the information from both models then we can achieve more: If the
optimal numbers of convinced voters coincide in both models, then we have found the provably
optimal achievable number of convinced voters although we had no single model for it. Other-
wise, we obtain at least upper and lower bounds. Moreover, any lower bound for the number of
convinced voters predicted by the lower-bound model is a lower bound on the number of achiev-
able convinced voters, and any upper bound on the number of convinced voters predicted by the
upper-bound model is an upper bound on the number of achievable convinced voters.
The first MILP model for the BC-model is a basic model with a compact number of variables
along the lines of the DG MILP. However, the system dynamics is discontinuous this time, which
requires a much heavier use of the Big-M method. MILP-experience tells us that too much use of
the Big-M method leads to difficulties in the solution process. Since the basic model did indeed
not scale well to a larger number of rounds, we engineered alternative models.
The resulting advanced MILP model for the BC optimal control problem has substantially
more variables but not so many Big-M constructions. Moreover, the advanced model uses a
perturbed objective function: Its integral part is the predicted number of convinced voters,
and one minus its fractional part represents the average distance of the unconvinced voters to
the conviction interval. This perturbation was introduced in order to better guide the solution
process. The problem with the unperturbed objective function is that many feasible controls
unavoidably achieve identical numbers of convinced voters because there are simply much fewer
distinct objective function values than controls; this is a degenerate situation, which is difficult
to handle for the MILP solver. The perturbation guarantees that two distinct controls are very
likely to have distinct objective function values.
Our hypothesis was that the advanced model would be easier to solve, which, to a certain
extent, turned out to be true. We know of no other method to date that yields more provable
and global information about optimal controls for the BC optimal control problem.
5.2. Computational Results on the Benchmark Campaign Problem. In the following
we report on our computational results. We first compare the effectiveness of the two modeling
approaches before we restrict ourselves to the more successful model.15
The MILP for the DG-model was very effective. It could be solved in seconds for the bench-
mark problem with homogeneous weights. Eleven convinced voters are possible for any horizon,
and, of course, no more. The control is non-crucial here, because homogeneous weights lead to
an immediate consensus in the conviction interval. But also for other weights, optimal solutions
can be found for all horizons very fast. The real conclusion is that solving the DG optimal
control problem on the scale of our benchmark problem is easy, but there are no mind-blowing
observations about optimal controls.
Using the basic MILP revealed that the BC-model is in an all different ball-park. Table 2 shows
the computational results for our basic lower-bound model, in particular, with ˆ = 10−5 > 0
15Because of its special characteristics the advanced model was accepted for the benchmark suite MI-
PLIB 2010 (Koch et al. 2011). Thus, the new model will automatically receive some attention by the developers
of MILP solver software and MILP researchers, which may help to clarify the yet open cases.
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# stages optimal value CPU time [s] # variables/binary/integer # constraints # non-zeroes
1 3 0.01 2454/ 1738/ 572 3487 11 330
2 4 1.42 4776/ 3377/1122 6809 22 319
3 5 355.33 7098/ 5016/1672 10 131 33 308
4 5–11 3600.00 9420/ 6655/2222 13 453 44 297
5 4–11 3600.00 11 742/ 8294/2772 16 775 55 286
6 5–11 3600.00 14 064/ 9933/3322 20 097 66 275
7 3–11 3600.00 16 386/11 572/3872 23 419 77 264
8 4–11 3600.00 18 708/13 211/4422 26 741 88 253
9 0–11 3600.00 21 030/14 850/4972 30 063 99 242
10 0–11 3600.00 23 352/16 489/5522 33 385 110 231
Table 2. Results of the basic MILP model for the benchmark prob-
lem with a positive ˆ (provably feasible configurations); number of
variables/constraints/non-zeroes for original problem before preprocessing; the
time limit was 1h = 3600s; MacBook Pro 2013, 2.6 GHz Intel Core i7, 16 GB
1600 MHz DDR3 RAM, OS X 10.9.2, zimpl 3.3.1, cplex 12.5 (Academic Initia-
tive License), branching priorities given according to stage structure.
yielding provably feasible controls.16 In order to really prove that no solutions with a better
objective (above the upper bound) exist, we would have to rerun the computations with an
ˆ ≤ 0. We skipped this for the basic model and did this only for the advanced model below,
since the information obtained by the advanced model is superior anyway.
The solutions of the basic lower-bound model determine for all stages, via the setting of
the control and opinion variables, trajectories of opinions. See Appendix A.1 for a detailed
description of all variables. All feasible solutions of our lower-bound model correspond to the data
of a BC-dynamics induced by the controls. Thus, these trajectories are exactly the trajectories
that would appear in a BC-simulation with the same controls. The numbers of convinced voters
induced by the trajectories always correspond to the lower values in the optimal value column
of Table 2. The corresponding trajectories of the solutions of our basic lower-bound model are
depicted in Figure 2. Here an empty red square represents the opinion of the control at that
stage. The circles represent the opinions of the non-strategic agents. The range of influence
for each control and the conviction interval are hinted by shaded regions. One can clearly see
that the structure of the optimal strategy heavily varies with N . No conspicuous pattern is
identifiable – at least for us.
Table 3 shows the computational results for our advanced lower-bound model, in particular,
with an ˆ = 10−5 > 0, i.e., all obtained configurations are feasible, i.e., the given controls provably
produce this objective function (within the numerical accuracy). For N = 6 and larger, cplex
(ILOG 2014) could not find an upper bound with fewer than 11 convinced voters in one hour.
For a time limit of 24h, however, the optimum was determined for N = 6, and the optimal
number 11 of convinced voters for N = 10 could be found. Moreover, a better feasible control
16We have added for each instance the typical information about the MILP problem scale, which is charac-
terized by the number of variables, integrality requirements, and non-zero constraint coefficients in the model.
The higher these values the larger and harder the problem is considered in the MILP world. Note that in ad-
dition to the obvious decision variables modeling the actual control opinion there is a large number of auxiliary
variables necessary to achieve the correct logic. Conventional MILP solvers fall back into a guided enumeration
(Branch-and-Bound) of discrete variables whenever they assess that no other information can be computed to
their advantage. Branching priorities tell the MILP solver which integral variables should be enumerated first,
second, etc.
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Figure 2. Trajectories produced by solutions of the basic MILP (for N ≥ 4
we show the incumbent solution when the time limit of 1h was exceeded, i.e.,
they only show the lower bounds on the optimal values reported in Table 2; for
N ≥ 9 no feasible solution was found in 1h, thus, in those cases we learned no
trajectories from the basic model).
# stages optimal value CPU time [s] # variables/binary/integer # constraints # non-zeroes
1 3.600 0.02 2367/ 2321/0 6261 62 551
2 4.615 0.18 4656/ 4576/0 11 420 122 736
3 5.640 2.40 6945/ 6831/0 16 579 182 921
4 6.653 113.91 9234/ 9086/0 21 738 243 106
5 6.676 1420.28 11 523/11 341/0 26 897 303 291
6 6.691–11.785 3600.00 13 812/13 596/0 32 056 363 476
7 5.703–11.826 3600.00 16 101/15 851/0 37 215 423 661
8 8.725–11.853 3600.00 18 390/18 106/0 42 374 483 846
9 7.746–11.872 3600.00 20 679/20 361/0 47 533 544 031
10 8.761–11.893 3600.00 22 968/22 616/0 52 692 604 216
Table 3. Results of the advanced MILP model for the benchmark prob-
lem with an ˆ = 10−5 > 0 (provably feasible configurations); number of
variables/constraints/non-zeroes for original problem before preprocessing; the
time limit was 1h = 3600s; MacBook Pro 2013, 2.6 GHz Intel Core i7, 16 GB
1600 MHz DDR3 RAM, OS X 10.9.2, zimpl 3.3.1, cplex 12.5 (Academic Initia-
tive License), branching priorities given according to stage structure. Remark:
For a time limit of 24h, 6 stages can be solved to optimality (optimal value
6.697) and for 10 stages we obtain a solution with 11 convinced voters (optimal
value 11.800−−11.840).
with objective 6.707 for N = 7 and of 8.767 for N = 9, respectively, could be computed in less
than 1h = 3600s on a faster computer17
17Mac Pro 2008 2×2.8 GHz Quad-Core Intel Xeon, 21 GB 800 MHz DDR2 RAM, OS X 10.9.5, zimpl 3.3.1,
cplex 12.5 (Academic Initiative License
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The instance for N = 10 is special in the sense that the trivial bound of 11 convinced voters is
sufficient to prove the “voter”-optimality of a solution with 11 convinced voters. It is yet an open
problem to find a configuration that provably maximizes the perturbed objective function of the
advanced model. Table 4 shows the computational results for our advanced upper-bound model,
# stages optimal value CPU time [s] # variables/binary/integer # constraints # non-zeroes
1 3.600 0.06 2367/ 2321/0 6261 62 551
2 4.615 0.44 4656/ 4576/0 11 420 122 736
3 5.640 7.84 6945/ 6831/0 16 579 182 921
4 6.657 303.81 9234/ 9086/0 21 738 243 106
5 6.668–11.743 3600.00 11 523/11 341/0 26 897 303 291
6 5.697–11.810 3600.00 13 812/13 596/0 32 056 363 476
7 5.701–11.864 3600.00 16 101/15 851/0 37 215 423 661
8 7.729–11.882 3600.00 18 390/18 106/0 42 374 483 846
9 8.741–11.896 3600.00 20 679/20 361/0 47 533 544 031
10 8.762–11.908 3600.00 22 968/22 616/0 52 692 604 216
Table 4. Results of the advanced MILP model for the benchmark problem
with an ˆ = −10−5 < 0 (capturing all feasible and possibly some infeasible
configurations); number of variables/constraints/non-zeroes for original problem
before preprocessing; the time limit was 1h = 3600s; MacBook Pro 2013, 2.6 GHz
Intel Core i7, 16 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 RAM, OS X 10.9.2, zimpl 3.3.1, cplex
12.5 (Academic Initiative License), branching priorities given according to stage
structure.
in particular, with an ˆ = −10−5 < 0, i.e., the obtained configurations may be infeasible, i.e., the
listed objective function values may be different than the results of the true BC-dynamics applied
to the computed controls. However, the set-up guarantees that no feasible configurations exist
that produce better objective function values. It is apparent that this time not even for N = 5
the optimal value of the upper-bound model could be found in 1h. This can be explained: Since
in the upper-bound model a solution has more freedom to classify “inside confidence interval: yes
or no”, it is harder for the solver to prove that high objective function values are impossible. On
a faster computer18 we obtained for the upper-bound model optimal values of 6.676 for N = 5
in 2649s and 6.700 for N = 6 in 117 597s, respectively. Thus, we know that more than six voters
are neither possible in five nor in six stages.
Table 5 summarizes the results that the advanced model can generate in 1h per computation
by combining the results of the lower-bound and upper-bound models. For up to 3 stages the
optimal value of an optimal BC-control was found. Regarding the number of achievable voters
only (the integral part of the objective function), we know that in 4 stages six voters are possible,
but no more. There is, however, a small gap between the optimal values of the lower-bound and
the upper-bound model. For 5 and more stages, the upper bound could not pushed below the
trivial bound 11 in 1h computation time.
We see that MILP modeling requires a lot of effort. We know, however, of no other method
to date that can prove global optimality of a control for N = 6 or larger.
Figures 3 and 4 as well as Figure 5 visualize trajectories. As with the basic model, the optimal
solution found by the MILP solver or, in the case of a timeout, the best feasible incumbent
solution, determine, via the values of corresponding variables, control values and opinion values
18Mac Pro 2008 2×2.8 GHz Quad-Core Intel Xeon, 21 GB 800 MHz DDR2 RAM, OS X 10.9.5, zimpl 3.3.1,
cplex 12.5 (Academic Initiative License
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# stages objective of an optimal BC-control
after 1h CPU time all we know from MILP
1 3.600 3.600
2 4.615 4.615
3 5.640 5.640
4 6.653– 6.657 6.653– 6.657
5 6.676–11.743 6.676
6 6.691–11.810 6.691– 6.700
7 5.703–11.864 6.707–11.864
8 8.725–11.882 8.725–11.882
9 7.746–11.896 8.767–11.896
10 8.761–11.908 11.800–11.908
Table 5. Summary of the knowledge that the advanced MILP model could
collect for the benchmark problem: first, what we know after 1h time limit per
computation and second, what we know at all (selected extra computations in
blue; tightening the upper bound for 7 ≤ N ≤ 9 would have been of paramount
interest but was out of reach for us, thus no new figures there).
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Figure 3. Trajectories produced by solutions of the advanced lower-bound
MILP for ˆ = 10−5 > 0 (provably feasible configurations); for N ≥ 6 we show
the incumbent solutions when the time limit of 1h was exceeded
for all voters in all stages. See Appendix A.2 for a detailed description of all variables.19 Again,
the numbers of convinced voters induced by the trajectories always correspond to the lower
values in the optimal value column of Tab Table 4 for the upper-bound model. The upper
values in those tables are produced by involved mathematical computations from MILP solving
technology (e.g., formal model relaxations). Therefore, they do not correspond to any underlying
trajectories.20 Figures 3 and 4 show trajectories induced by the provably feasible solutions of
19Note that the voters’ opinion values have not been taken from the results of a BC-simulation on the basis of
the control values; they have rather been taken from the MILP solution vector directly. This way we can better
see the differences between solutions to the lower- and the upper-bound model: for the indicated control, the
former always produces trajectories that a BC-simulation would have produced, whereas the latter may produce
trajectories that are impossible in a BC-simulation.
20Recall that in the summarizing table 5 the lower values stem from lower bounds (derived from feasible
solutions) to the lower -bound model and the upper values stem from upper bounds (derived by MILP machinery)
20 R. HEGSELMANN, S. KO¨NIG, S. KURZ, C. NIEMANN, AND J. RAMBAU
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Figure 4. Trajectories produced by solutions of the advanced lower-bound
MILP for ˆ = 10−5 > 0 (provably feasible configurations) for 6 (optimal ob-
jective) and 10 (optimal number of convinced voters) stages in a time limit of
24h.
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Figure 5. Trajectories produced by solutions of the advanced upper-bound
MILP for ˆ = −10−5 < 0 (capturing all feasible and possibly some infeasible
configurations); for N ≥ 5 we show the incumbent solution when the time limit
of 1h was exceeded; note the obviously infeasibly splitting trajectories forN = 10
stages for voters 1 and 2 in stage 7.
the advanced lower-bound model with ˆ = 10−5 > 0. Figure 5 shows the (possibly infeasible)
solutions of the advanced upper-bound model for ˆ = −10−5 < 0; infeasibility is best seen for 10
stages where trajectories split, which is impossible for feasible trajectories.
Splitting trajectories in the upper-bound model illustrate the fact that opinion trajectories
that are feasible solutions for the upper-bound model21 are not necessarily feasible trajectories
of opinions under the BC-dynamics. Trajectories coming from the upper-bound model can, e.g.,
split: For identical opinions i and j whose distance from opinion k is between  + ˆ <  and 
the optimization algorithm may choose that i is in the confidence interval of k but j is not. This
can lead to different opinions of i and j in the upcoming stage. This contrasts the situation in
for the upper -bound model. Thus, the numbers of convinced voters induced by the trajectories in Figure 5 that
stem from lower bounds to the upper -bound model do not appear at all in Table 5.
21Recall, this is characterized by a negative safety margin ˆ < 0, see Section 5.1 for the idea and A.2 for the
full details.
OPTIMAL OPINION CONTROL: THE CAMPAIGN PROBLEM 21
the lower-bound model.22 The lower-bound model is designed in such a way that all solutions
with opinions at a distance between  and + ˆ >  are infeasible for it.23
What can we learn from the provably optimal solutions? We see that
• some controls near the end of the horizon just decrease the average distance of non-
convinced voters to the conviction interval, i.e., they are induced by the perturbation of
the objective function
• the controls of the earlier stages, however, always try to pull a voter as far as possible,
i.e., they are exactly at confidence distance to some selected voter
The second observation will be exactly what is used in Section 6 as an idea for a clever heuristics.
5.3. Computational Results on Random Instances. Of course, the choice of the particular
benchmark problem is completely arbitrary. We want to provide additional evidence for the
observation that DG control is easier than BC control and that the advanced model performs
better than the basic one. To this end, we tested all models on random instances. We chose a
uniform distribution of start opinions in the unit interval. The conviction interval was constructed
by choosing a party opinion o uniformly at random in the unit interval and a conviction distance ∆
uniformly at random between 0.1 and 0.2. The conviction interval then contained all values with
a distance at most the conviction distance from the party opinion, cut-off at zero and one,
respectively. The confidence distance  was chosen uniformly at random between 0.1 and 0.2 as
well. We drew five samples of random data and ran cplex (ILOG 2014) with a time limit of one
hour on the resulting instances with one up to ten stages. See Table 6 for the data realizations
of the five samples used.
Sample 1 2 3 4 5
Start Opinions
1 0.0001143810805199624 0.02592622792020585 0.0707248803392809 0.1726953250292445 0.05518012076038404
2 0.09233859556083068 0.1850820815155939 0.121328579290148 0.2160895006302953 0.08982103413199563
3 0.1281244478021107 0.3205364363548663 0.2909047436646429 0.5472322533715591 0.2067191540744898
4 0.146755892584742 0.3303348203958791 0.4370619401887669 0.5975562058383497 0.2219931714287943
5 0.2360889763189687 0.4203678016598261 0.5108276010748994 0.609035598255935 0.3637368954633681
6 0.3023325678199372 0.4353223932989226 0.5507979045041831 0.6977288244985344 0.4884111901019726
7 0.417021998534217 0.4359949027271929 0.5693113258037044 0.7148159946582316 0.6117438617189749
8 0.7203244894557456 0.4847490963257731 0.7081478223456413 0.8556209450717133 0.831327840180911
9 0.9325573614175797 0.5496624760678183 0.8399490424990534 0.9006214549067946 0.8707323036786941
10 0.9971848083653452 0.9315408638053435 0.8929469580512835 0.9670298385822749 0.9186109045796587
11 0.9990405156274885 0.9477306110662712 0.8962930913307454 0.9726843540493129 0.9794449978460197
Parameters
 0.1387910740307511 0.1698862689477127 0.1040630737561879 0.1224505926767482 0.1354138042860231
o 0.3965807262334462 0.1544266755586552 0.01874801028025057 0.1414641728954073 0.3967366065822394
∆ 0.1186260211324845 0.1204648636096308 0.1040630737561879 0.1976274454960663 0.1765907860306536
Table 6. Random data, sampled with 16 significant decimal digits precision.
Table 7 shows the results for an ˆ = 10−5 > 0; we again skip the upper-bound computation
with ˆ = −10−5 < 0. One very interesting phenomenon can be identified in Sample 5: the
number of convincible voters is not monotonically increasing with the number of stages available
for control. There can be some unavoidable ‘distraction’ caused by other voters. While in two
stages we can achieve five convinced voters, in three stages no more than three are possible. This
is some more evidence for the assessment that bounded-confidence dynamics can lead to the
emergence of various counter-intuitive structures that make the dynamic system appear random
and erratic though it actually is deterministic.
22Recall, this is characterized by a positive safety margin ˆ > 0.
23Recall, that this renders all ‘cutting-edge’ solutions infeasible in the lower-bound model although in fact
some of them may still be feasible trajectories in the BC-dynamics.
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# stages DG BC (basic) BC (advanced)
opt. val. CPU [s] opt. val. CPU [s] opt. val. CPU [s]
Sample 1
1 11 <0.01 2 0.01 2.48 0.03
2 11 <0.01 2 1.77 2.49 0.22
3 11 <0.01 2 190.56 2.51 3.62
4 11 0.01 3–11 3600.00 3.49 114.40
5 11 0.01 3–11 3600.00 3.51 1754.67
6 11 0.01 1–11 3600.00 3.52– 8.62 3600.00
7 11 0.01 3–11 3600.00 3.53–11.60 3600.00
8 11 0.01 −∞–11 3600.00 3.54–11.76 3600.00
9 11 0.01 −∞–11 3600.00 3.55–11.78 3600.00
10 11 0.02 −∞–11 3600.00 2.56–11.81 3600.00
Sample 2
1 0 <0.01 2 0.01 2.72 0.02
2 0 <0.01 2 3.30 2.73 0.18
3 0 <0.01 2 378.88 2.73 2.02
4 0 <0.01 2–11 3600.00 2.73 87.14
5 0 <0.01 1–11 3600.00 2.74 1558.18
6 0 <0.01 0–11 3600.00 2.75– 9.79 3600.00
7 0 <0.01 1–11 3600.00 2.76– 9.83 3600.00
8 0 <0.01 −∞–11 3600.00 2.76–11.85 3600.00
9 0 <0.01 0–11 3600.00 9.80–11.87 3600.00
10 0 <0.01 −∞–11 3600.00 9.81–11.88 3600.00
Sample 3
1 0 <0.01 2 0.01 2.53 0.01
2 0 <0.01 2 2.04 2.54 0.05
3 0 <0.01 3 233.37 3.54 0.30
4 0 <0.01 2–11 3600.00 3.54 2.30
5 0 <0.01 3–11 3600.00 3.55 53.41
6 0 <0.01 3–11 3600.00 3.55 985.32
7 0 <0.01 3–11 3600.00 3.56– 3.61 3600.00
8 0 <0.01 −∞–11 3600.00 3.56– 8.69 3600.00
9 0 <0.01 3–11 3600.00 3.56– 8.67 3600.00
10 0 <0.01 −∞–11 3600.00 3.57– 8.75 3600.00
Sample 4
1 0 <0.01 2 0.01 2.49 0.01
2 0 <0.01 2 1.67 2.49 0.05
3 0 <0.01 2 89.49 2.50 0.30
4 0 <0.01 2–11 3600.00 2.51 2.30
5 0 <0.01 2–11 3600.00 2.51 24.45
6 0 <0.01 2–11 3600.00 2.52 278.52
7 0 <0.01 2–11 3600.00 2.53 1281.73
8 0 <0.01 2–11 3600.00 2.54– 7.59 3600.00
9 0 <0.01 −∞–11 3600.00 2.54– 7.67 3600.00
10 0 <0.01 −∞–11 3600.00 2.55–11.71 3600.00
Sample 5
1 8 <0.01 3 0.01 3.63 0.02
2 11 <0.01 5 1.57 5.64 0.17
3 11 <0.01 3 89.57 3.66 1.51
4 11 0.01 7–11 3600.00 7.67 5.39
5 11 0.01 7–11 3600.00 7.69 36.32
6 11 0.01 3–11 3600.00 7.70 456.57
7 11 0.01 7–11 3600.00 7.72 2590.83
8 11 0.01 7–11 3600.00 7.73–11.79 3600.00
9 11 0.01 7–11 3600.00 7.74–11.83 3600.00
10 11 0.01 −∞–11 3600.00 7.75–11.86 3600.00
Table 7. Results of the lower-bound MILP models on random instances; the
time limit was 1h = 3600.00s; MacBook Pro 2013, 2.6 GHz Intel Core i7, 16 GB
1600 MHz DDR3 RAM, OS X 10.9.2, zimpl 3.3.1, cplex 12.5 (Academic Initia-
tive License), branching priorities given according to stage structure.
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6. Heuristics to Find Good Controls
In the previous section we have described a MILP-formulation of our problem. So in principle
one could solve every problem instance by standard of-the-shelf software like cplex (ILOG 2014).
In contrast to the DG-model, where we could solve our benchmark problem for any number of
stages between between 1 and 10 without any difficulty, the instances from the BC-model are
harder. Using the MILP-formulation of the previous section we were only able to determine the
optimal control up to 6 stages using cplex.
The approach using a MILP-formulation has the great advantage that we receive dual, i.e.,
upper, bounds for the optimal control. For the lower-bound direction (find feasible controls)
one can equally well employ heuristics that can determine good controls more efficiently. Note
that also the MILP-approach benefits from good feasible solutions, especially if they respect
fixed variables in the branch-and-bound search tree.24 So in the next subsections we give three
heuristics to find good controls.
6.1. The Strongest-Guy Heuristics. What makes the problem hard, apart from the discon-
tinuous dynamics and numerical instabilities, is the fact, that the control xt0 is a continuous
variable in all stages t. Thus, at first sight the problem is not a finite one. Let us relax our
problem a bit by allowing only a finite number of possibilities for xt0 at any stage and have a
closer look at the situation.
By placing a control xt0 at stage t some voters are influenced by the control while others are
not influenced by the control. We notice that the magnitude of influence rises with the distance
between the voters opinion xti and the control x
t
0 as long as their distance remains below . So
the idea is, even though we are not knowing what we are doing, we will do it with full strength.
Let c = l+r2 be the center of the conviction interval [l, r] and
µ(i, t) =
 max(x
t
i + , 1) if i ∈ I and xti ≤ c,
min(xti − , 0) if i ∈ I and xti > c,
c if i = 0
be a mapping from
(
I ∪{0}
)
×N≥0 to [0, 1]. Pulling an agent i ∈ I at stage t with full strength
towards the center of the conviction interval means to place the control at µ(i, t). The special
choice of the function for i = 0 attracts the agents towards the center of the conviction interval
and aims to avoid oversteering and oscillations. We call this relaxation of the problem the
strongest-guy heuristics.
Instead of giving the exact values of xt0 for all stages t we can also give a sequence of in-
dices [i0, i1, . . . , iN−1] of those voters that are pulled at maximum strength. The number of such
sequences is finite. Therefore, the controls arising this way can be enumerated, in principle, see
Algorithm 1.
In Table 8 we give for our benchmark problem the maximum number of convinced voters that
can be achieved by using the strongest guy heuristics together with the corresponding index-
vector.25 The corresponding trajectories are drawn in Figure 6. We observe that the strongest-
guy heuristics improves the best found solution of the ILP approach, given 1h of computation
time, for N = 7 stages by two additional convinced voters. For N = 4 stages the heuristics
misses the optimum of 6 convinced voters by one. Given the upper bounds from Table 5 we can
conclude that the strongest-guy heuristics found an optimal solution for N ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10}.
24A branch-and-bound search tree is built by conventional MILP solvers in order to organize the enumeration
of integral variables. In each node of that tree, some of the integral variables have been fixed to a value. A heuristic
is only useful in the branch-and-bound solution process if it can find solutions in all nodes of the branch-and-bound
tree, i.e., solutions that are consistent with the variable fixings in that node.
25We have used an implementation with exact arithmetic to avoid numerical inaccuracies.
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# stages # convinced voters control sequence
0 3 []
1 3 [4]
2 4 [4, 4]
3 5 [3, 8, 0]
4 5 [3, 3, 8, 0]
5 6 [3, 3, 8, 10, 3]
6 6 [3, 8, 8, 2, 7, 2]
7 8 [3, 8, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1]
8 8 [3, 6, 0, 3, 1, 9, 9, 9]
9 8 [3, 8, 6, 0, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9]
10 11 [3, 0, 0, 10, 6, 9, 3, 4, 7, 0]
Table 8. Results of the strongest-guy heuristics on the benchmark example.
Algorithm 1: Strongest-Guy Heuristics
Input : , I, N , x0i for all i ∈ I
Output: best configuration for the strategic agent
1 champion ← −1
2 foreach [i0, i1 . . . , iN−1] in
(
I ∪ {0}
)N
do
3 κ ← NumberOfConvincedVoters (µ(i0, 0), µ(i1, 1), . . . , µ(iN−1, N − 1))
4 if κ > champion then /* better solution found? */
5 champion ← κ
6 for j ← 0 to N − 1 do /* update best solution */
7 i?j ← ij
8 end
9 end
10 end
11 return best solution
We can improve upon these findings by slightly modifying the strongest-guy heuristics. In
order to improve the running time of our implementation, we had replaced the exact arithmetic by
floating point numbers. To avoid numerical instabilities we had experimented with the positions
xti +  − δ and xti −  + δ for δ = 10−6, i.e. almost full strength. Curiously enough, we have
obtained better solutions in some cases. For N = 4 stages the δ-modified control sequence
[3, 3, 8, 6], corresponding to the control
x0 =
(
349999
1000000
,
309999
800000
,
550001
1000000
,
122599789
200000000
)
≈ (0.349999, 0.387499, 0.550001, 0.612999) ,
results in six convinced voters. The corresponding trajectory is drawn in Figure 7. We remark
that we are not aware of any further improvements.
Having a look at the optimal controls of Table 8 one gets an impression of the hardness of
our problem. There seems to be no obvious pattern in the optimal controls. Who would have
guessed a control like [3, 0, 0, 10, 6, 9, 3, 4, 7, 0] or [3, 8, 8, 2, 7, 2]?
We remark that the strongest-guy heuristics can be easily adopted to the situation where
some of the 0-1 variables from the MILP formulation (see Appendix A) are fixed to either 0 or 1.
Thus, it is possible to install a call-back to the strongest-guy heuristics inside an MILP solution
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Figure 6. Trajectories produced by solutions of the strongest-guy heuristics
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Figure 7. Trajectories produced by solution of the modified strongest-guy
heuristics for N = 4
process. However, in our experience the MILP solution needs most of the time to tighten the
dual bound.
6.2. A Genetic Algorithm. To get a better idea about the solution space, we implemented a
genetic algorithm (GA) to heuristically search for optimal solutions.
GAs work on the analogy of biological evolution and the Darwinian principle of survival of the
fittest. They test many sets of parameters automatically to find good solutions to the problem.
GAs work based on rounds (so called generations). Parameter sets resulting in good solutions
advance to the next generation, bad ones are discarded. By modifying the good parameter sets
before testing them again, new sets are created and tested. Over the course of many rounds the
quality of the solutions gradually increases. Eventually one hopes to find a very good solution
without having to brute-force all possible parameter combinations.
Because a new parameter set is created by modifying existing sets that are already showing
useful results, one of the main assumptions of GA is the idea that the solution space is somewhat
smooth and that the optimal solution is found close to an already good solution. If the solution
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space is heavily fragmented and good solutions are just slightly removed from very bad solutions
GAs tend not to work. During the execution of a GA this would manifest in a non-increasing
overall solution quality.
6.2.1. Setup of the GA. To find a solution for the voting problem, the only parameters that can
be influenced are the position of the strategic agent for each of the discrete time events. In GAs
each parameter set is called a chromosome, a single parameter is a gene. In the voter’s game, a
chromosome consists of ten genes, which each encode one position of the strategic agent in the
opinion space.
To prevent any rounding problems inherent to the float and double data types in Java (see
Section 3), we chose to use fractions instead. The numerator and the denominator are represented
as Java’s BigInteger. Thus, the calculation is exact and does not suffer from the usual rounding
problems that Java encounters with the primitive data types.26
One of the most popular packages to implement GAs in Java is JGAP – Java Genetic Algo-
rithm Package27. It provides a framework for the GA that must be extended with the problem
specific fitness function and the chromosome implementation. Then it can be used to execute
selection, cross over, mutation and evolution on the chromosomes. We used JGAP version 3.3.3.
Each run of the GA start with a population of 500 randomly generated chromosomes. Fur-
thermore, we had to determine how many generations the GA should evolve. We set this value
to 250 rounds. After 250 rounds, the overall quality of the solutions did not increase, but reached
a plateau from which the GA did not find any better solutions.
6.2.2. Chromosome And Fitness Function. Each chromosome is a list of the strategic agents
position in that particular configuration. To assess the quality of the chromosome, we have to
calculate how many of the voting agents are convinced by the configuration after ten rounds
of the game. Analogous to the biological survival of the fittest GAs evaluate the quality of a
solution with a fitness function. This function is highly specific to the problem.
To assess the fitness of each chromosome, we started out with the simplest possible fitness
function: At the end of the game we counted how many voters were actually convinced. Whether
or not a voting agent had been convinced was determined by the party that the agent was closest
to. Because we tried to convince voting agents to vote for party 2, any voting agent that was
closer to party 2 than to any other party was considered a voter for that party. The parties have
fixed positions in the opinion space. They are located at positions 0.25, 0.5, 0.75. Effectively this
results in the conviction interval of [0.375, 0.625]. If a voting agent ended up in that interval, it
was considered a voter.
This fitness function (called MaxVoter (MV)), see Figure 8 for a typical run of the GA with
the MV fitness function, suffers several drawbacks. The main one is that it is a discrete function:
A voting agent is either convinced or it is not convinced. If there are two chromosomes that both
evaluate to nine voters one cannot tell whether one of the chromosomes is closer to ten voters
than the other. For instance, a chromosome A could yield the positions
A = {0, 0.38, 0.39, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.55, 0.6, 0.61, 0.62, 1},
chromosome B could yield
B = {0.37, 0.38, 0.39, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.55, 0.6, 0.61, 0.62, 0.63}.
Both chromosomes result in nine convinced voters. However, chromosome B has the two non-
convinced voters (at positions 0.37 and 0.63) much closer to the conviction interval than chro-
mosome A (non-convinced voters at position 0 and 1). Probably chromosome B is closer to an
26See Section 3 for the relevance of this.
27http://jgap.sf.net
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Figure 8. GA with the MaxVotes fitness function yielding at most eight voters
optimal solution than chromosome A. Therefore it should have a higher fitness value. To account
for these shortcomings, we used eight different fitness functions with varying results.
The fitness functions fall into three different categories:
Weighted Sum: This category of fitness functions calculates the weighted sum of all the
voters final positions. The weight to be used is computed with a given partially defined
function that maps a position to a weight. The MV fitness function is a special case
of the Weighted Sum class of functions, because it assigns weight 1 to all positions in
the conviction interval and weight 0 otherwise. The other functions used in this class
are DistanceToParty2 (D2P2) and BorderDistanceToAll (BD2A). Both of them differ
from MV in that they assign values between 0 and 1 to positions that (a) are not in
the conviction interval with higher values the closer the position is to the interval or
(b) decreasing values within the interval, the closer the position is to the center of the
interval. This leads to positions of voters on the very edges of the interval to be the
most favorable. The idea behind evaluating positions within the interval differently is
that voters sitting on the edges of the interval have the greatest effect on voters that are
not in the range yet.
Last Remaining: The class of the last remaining fitness functions does not evaluate ev-
ery voter but restricts itself to convinced voters (counted with weight 1) and the nearest
voter that has not reached the conviction interval yet (weighted according to the func-
tion). All other voters are assigned weight 0. The fitness function in this category is
BorderDistanceToMin (BD2M), which has the same form as BD2A from the Weighted
Sum category.
Minimum Distance: The last class of fitness functions does not evaluate all voters po-
sitions but takes into account the distance between the two outmost voters (i. e. the
voter with the highest opinion and the voter with the lowest opinion). Because of the
order preserving characteristics of the model, these two voters do not change throughout
one run, which means, we can just use the distance between the voter that started with
opinion 0 and the one that started with opinion 1. If the distance is in the range of
[0, 0.25], which is the size of the conviction interval, the fitness evaluates to the maxi-
mum fitness value of 10. If the distance is greater than 0.25, the function computes a
value that is decreasing to 0 with increasing distance. The two functions used in this
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original chromosomes new chromosomes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 → 1 2 3 4 5 6 G H I J
A B C D E F G H I J → A B C D E F 7 8 9 0
Table 9. Example for a cross over at gene 7. Letters and numbers depict
individual genes.
class are MinimumDistanceBetweenFirstAndLast (MDBFL) and MinimumDistanceBe-
tweenFirstAndLastSquare (MDBFLS) that have a linear or quadratic slope respectively.
A third function in this class is the MinimumDistanceBetweenFirstAndLastToCenter-
Square (MDBFL2CS) that accounts for the fact that the group of voters with opinions
below 0.5 may not behave symmetrically to the group with opinions above 0.5. This
asymmetry can result in the position range not to be centered around 0.5 but deviate
from that midpoint. Such behavior is undesirable, since the original goal is to get as
many voters close to 0.5 as possible. MDBFL2CS accounts for this and evaluates the po-
sitions of the two outmost voters with respect to their distance to the desired midpoint.
The two values are added.
6.2.3. Selection. At the end of each round, the fitness value for each chromosome is calculated.
Based on the fitness value, the core idea of the GA takes place: Those chromosomes with a high
fitness value have a larger chance to “survive” and to advance into the next round. Specifically,
the GA framework provides two different selection routines. One selection (weighted roulette
selector, WRS) assigns each chromosome a probability of survival based on its fitness value.
The population of chromosomes for the next generation is picked according to the probabilities.
The other selector (Best Chromosomes Selector, BCS) discards the chromosomes with the lowest
fitness values and lets the other chromosomes survive. This selector converges quicker than the
WRS. However, its disadvantage is the possibility that it gets stuck in a local optimum, which
is not the global optimum.
6.2.4. Cross Over And Mutation. Finally, the new population is crossed over and mutated. The
Cross over operator picks two chromosomes of the new population at random. Then it picks a
random number n between 1 and the number of genes in the chromosome (i. e. in the voter’s
game a number between 1 and 10). It splits both chromosomes at the n-th gene, resulting in
four halves: chromosome 1, part 1 (C1.1), chromosome 1, part 2 (C1.2), chromosome 2, part 1
(C2.1) and chromosome 2, part 2 (C2.2). It “crosses over” the second parts of the chromosomes,
resulting in two new chromosomes, made up of C1.1 and C2.2 (chromosome A) and C1.2 and
C2.1 (chromosome B). Table 9 shows an example for a cross over between two chromosomes.
The rate how often cross over happens depends on the population size. It is r =
population size
2 .
Every time the operator is invoked cross over happens
population size
r . Thus, with a population
of 500, cross over happens two times per generation.
The mutation operator picks one gene of a random chromosome. It replaces the gene with a
random value. The mutation rate was fixed at 115 , resulting in 33.33 mutation per generation.
6.2.5. Evolution. After each round the GA determines the fitness of each chromosome. Then it
selects the fittest chromosomes according to the selector and puts them into the next population.
Once the candidate set has been established, the cross over and mutation happen on the candidate
set. After both genetic operators have finished, the GA has established the population for the
next generation of chromosomes and starts to evaluate them again. This happens until either a
satisfactory fitness value has been reached by one chromosome (ie. 11 voters for the voter game)
or until the maximum number of generations has been reached (ie. 250). Finally the GA outputs
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the best solution. There are different selection algorithms available. We used two different ones,
which are among the standard selection algorithms:
Weighted Roulette Selector (WRS): Each chromosome is assigned a probability to
advance to the next round proportional to its fitness. Then the population for the next
round is chosen by randomly picking a chromosome from the so called ‘roulette wheel’
as often as desired. This selection method allows for some chromosomes with low fitness
values to advance to the next round, which results in a lower chance to reach a local
optimum too quickly.
Best Chromosomes Selector (BCS): The BCS sorts the population according to the
fitness values and discards the fraction with the lowest fitness values. The ration of
chromosomes to retain is configurable. BCS fosters depth search with the danger of
reaching a local optimum. As an advantage, it progresses much quicker than WRS.
After the chromosomes for the next round have been selected, the GA performs the crossover
and mutation operations, whose parameters (percentage of the mutation, point of crossover) are
configurable.
6.2.6. Pseudo-Code. To provide an explanation that is closer to the actual code, the pseudo code
for the core GA routines looks like this:
6.2.7. Results. Figure 9 shows the performance of the different fitness functions. One notable
observation is the step like behavior of the MV fitness function: Already around round 30, it
reaches eight voters, but does not advance from there. All the other fitness functions show a
much smoother behavior. However, with the exception of BD2A and MDBFLS, all functions
seem to have reached a plateau around round 150.
Figure 9. Different fitness functions reach different results
Judged from the performance of the fitness functions, BD2A promises the best results as it
still progresses at round 250 and also reached a high fitness value. However, as BD2A optimizes
a slightly different problem than the original problem. Therefore, the performance with respect
to the fitness function has to be compared with the performance of the fitness function with
respect to the voters.
Figure 10 depicts the performance of the fitness functions MV, BD2M, and MDBFLS. While
MV maps the original problem exactly, only BD2M provides a good mapping. MDBFLS (and
all other fitness functions alike) does not provide a good mapping of a fitness value to a certain
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Algorithm 2: Genetic Algorithm
Input : populationSize, maxRounds, selector
Output: best configuration for the strategic agent
1 population ← InitializeRandomPopulation(populationSize)
2 for i← 1 to maxRounds do /* fitness evaluation */
3 foreach chromosome in population do
4 EvaluateFitness (chromosome)
5 end
6 if maximum fitness has been reached then /* stop evolution */
7 return best solution
8 end
9 newPopulation ← selector(population) /* selection */
10 for j ← 1 to populationSize×2
1×populationSize do /* cross over */
11 chromosome 1 ← random chromosome from newPopulation
12 chromosome 2 ← random chromosome from newPopulation
13 remove chromosome 1 and chromosome 2 from newPopulation
14 crossOver(chromosome 1, chromosome 2)
15 newPopulation ← add modified chromosome 1 and chromosome 2
16 end
17 for j ← 1 to 115 populationSize do /* mutation */
18 chromosome ← select random chromosome from newPopulation
19 remove chromosome from newPopulation
20 Mutate(random gene in chromosome)
21 newPopulation ← add mutated chromosome
22 end
23 population ← newPopulation
24 end
25 return best solution
Figure 10. Performance of three fitness functions with respect to the convinced voters
number of voters. This, of course, poses a problem, since the only way for the GA of evaluating
a certain strategy is the fitness function. The graph suggest that, apart from MV, only BD2M
should be used.
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Of the two different selectors available, BCS proved to be the most useful of the two. While
the WRS worked, the evolution of the population happened very slowly regardless of the fitness
function used. Figure 11 shows the result of the two selectors while using the same fitness
function (BD2A). Similar results hold for all other fitness functions as well.
Figure 11. Comparison of two different selectors
Because of these findings, the BD2M fitness function has been tested with different values
for the best performing selector BCS. The selector allows to configure the fraction of vot-
ers that advances from one generation to the next. With a value of 50% only the better
half of chromosomes advances. This leads to an extremely narrow search that runs into high
risks of lingering at a local optimum. To increase the chances of leaving a local optimum
again, the percentage should be increased. In the simulation, runs with ratios from the set
{0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85, 0.9, 0.91, 0.92, 0.93, 0.94, 0.95, 0.96, 0.97, 0.98, 0.99} have been used.
From these runs, only ratios above 0.75 resulted in stable evolution patterns, while rates below
had their fitness values alternate between very low and very high values but did not converge.
Above 75% all runs converged with an optimal rate at around 95%. The runs with ratios of
0.95 and 0.96 were the ones that produced strategies that at least gave nine convinced voters.
Figure 12 shows these two runs and the number of voters that each chromosome generated.
Figure 12. The two runs for different values for the BCS survival rate
Altogether the GA provides a heuristics to find optimal (or near optimal) solutions. However,
because of the problem structure the GA did not find an optimal solution for the control problem.
The most convinced voters that the GA could find a strategy for were nine in the example setting.
Strategies yielding nine voters were extremely rare and could only be obtained in settings with
highly tuned parameters. This result seems to indicate that the solution space has a very sparse
population that could possibly occupy a very restricted region in the space.
6.3. The Model Predictive Control Heuristics. The observation that our benchmark prob-
lem can be solved to optimality if restricted to just a few stages suggests the following receding-
horizon control heuristics (RHC), sometimes also known under the name model predictive control
(MPC). See Algorithm 3 for a pseudocode describing MPC.
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Algorithm 3: The MPC Heuristics
Input : a confidence radius ,
a set of agents I,
a horizon N ,
start opinions x0,
an MPC horizon Nˇ ∈ N
a solver OptimalControl(x¯, N¯, ) for start opinions x¯ on horizon N¯
Output: a control sequence ut, 0 ≤ t < N , for the strategic agent
1 x¯ ← x0 /* initialize opinions */
2 t ← 0 /* initialize stage counter */
3 while t < N do /* receding-horizon loop */
4 N¯ ← min(Nˇ ,N − t) /* cut the MPC horizon to no. of stages left */
5 (u¯s)0≤s<N¯ ← OptimalControl(x¯, N¯, ) /* solve MPC-auxiliary problem */
6 ut ← u¯0 /* set next control to first MPC control */
7 x¯ ← BC-dynamics(ut, x¯, ) /* update opinions */
8 end
9 return ut, 0 ≤ t < N
Although this method uses exact optima of a related optimal control problem, it is in general
a suboptimal control. The hope is that its performance is in many cases not too far away from
the optimal objective value.
For our computational results we used the advanced MILP to solve the upcoming MPC-
auxiliary problems. In order to simplify the setup, we implemented MPC in the following form:
Compute the MPC-auxiliary problem, then fix the first control to the solution value, finally
increase the number of stages for the MPC-auxiliary problem by one and repeat. This way, the
opinions in past stages are computed from scratch in each iteration based on fixed controls. This
does not make a difference in the resulting number of convinced voters. Because of the usage of
rounded intermediate results (the fixed controls for earlier stages), we observed some infeasible
problems. This was cured by changing the control values by ±10−6, which cured the problem in
all cases.
MPC-horizon # convinced voters CPU time [s] for last MPC-auxiliary problem
3 6 6.27
4 8 60.41
5 8 163.43
Table 10. Results of the MPC heuristics for various shorter horizons based
on the advanced MILP model applied to the benchmark problem with 10
stages; MacBook Pro 2013, 2.6 GHz Intel Core i7, 16 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 RAM,
OS X 10.9.2, zimpl 3.3.1, cplex 12.5 (Academic Initiative License), branching
priorities given according to stage structure.
Table 10 shows the computational results for the MPC heuristics. We see that it is unable to
find the optimal control with 11 convinced voters in 10 stages. This indicates that the control
leading to 11 convinced voters must use control sub-sequences of at least length five that are
suboptimal on the shortened horizon. This is another hint that optimal controls exhibit non-
trivial structures.
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The conclusion of this section on heuristics is that an intelligent tailor-made combinatorial
heuristics works best on our very special benchmark problem. The reason for this is most
probably that in the fitness landscape of this benchmark problem solutions with more than nine
convinced voters are rare and hidden.
For a more general assessment, all methods should compete on a complete benchmark suite
with random perturbations of parameters. This, however, goes beyond the purpose of this paper,
in which we wanted to advertise the field of optimal opinion control and show some possible
directions of future research.
7. Interpretation of Results
The computational results are twofold: first we have collected results about optimal controls
including their performance (how many convinced voters are possible?) and about models and
solution methods including their effectivity (how tight is the information they compute?), and
efficiency (how quickly do they compute that information?).
The results about models and solution methods confirm that the BC optimal control problem is
much more difficult than the DG optimal control problem. BC optimal control must be modeled
with care: the advanced model performs much better in all tests than the basic model. It is the
method that, so far, provides the tightest information on the performance of optimal controls
in all our benchmark problems. Still, our ability to find provably optimal controls is limited.
Using the fast strongest-guy heuristic, we could find upper bounds for the number of achievable
convinced voters that are tight for our benchmark problem in all known cases.
The results about optimal controls themselves confirm that the BC dynamics causes many
interesting effects: Neither is the number of achievable convinced voters monotone in time, nor
does every optimal campaign for N stages constitute an optimal campaign for any smaller number
of stages. In other words: Enlarging the time horizon in an otherwise unchanged campaign
problem requires a completely new solution. Though this sounds plausible in the real-world, we
do not claim that this conclusion can safely be transferred to real-world campaign-planning –
what we rather state is that it takes no more than the mechanism of BC opinion dynamics to
let this effect emerge.
8. Conclusion and Outlook
We have introduced the problem of optimal opinion control by simply allowing one individual
to freely choose in each stage its advertised opinion. All efforts to find optimal controls in a
small example instance showed that the structure of optimal controls is complicated. Modeling
with MILP-techniques is possible, but even sophisticated models are hard to solve. An optimal
control for the campaign problem with eleven voters and one through ten stages remains open
for seven through nine stages. Ten stages could be solved by the strongest-guy heuristics, which
is able to convince all eleven voters in ten stages. Popular meta-heuristics like genetic algorithms
and model predictive control could not find this solution.
The fact that the small campaign problem is still largely a mystery, make its investigation
interesting for further research. More specifically:
• What happens if the number of voters increases? How do methods to compute optimal
controls scale with this paramter? If there are really many voters (like 1000), what is a
plausible control concept to gain a significant influence?
• How do optimal controls change with respect to certain properties of the uncontrolled
dynamics? Are situations with uncontrolled consensus easier to control optimally? Are
situations easier to control optimally where uncontrolled opinions automatically would
end up in the conviction interval?
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• Are there more counter-intuitive effects? Can it happen that constantly controlling with
the central opinion of the conviction interval yields fewer voters than no control at all?
• What happens if we have control restrictions? If each control has to be inside an interval
around the true opinion of the controller, how do optimal controls change and are the
methods to compute them still applicable? What if the true opinion inducing these
restrictions is itself subject to opinion dynamics?
Other directions are the generalization to more than one controller (game theory) and multi-
dimensional opinion spaces. That is:
• How should a suitable game be defined in the first place? Should it be one game with
one strategy consisting of ten controls? Should it be an iterated game with only one
control as a strategy? Are there equilibria in one and/or the other model?
• Do all equilibrium strategies lead to the same ‘election winner’ (= party who ‘convinced’
most voters)?
• Do three or more controllers make a structural difference?
• Is it ‘easier’ (in a sense yet to be defined) to ‘win an election’ with a ‘radical’ (close
to zero or one) or a ‘moderate’ (close to 0.5 or in the middle of the competitors) party
opinion?
• Does any of these change if the opinion space has a higher dimension?
We think that optimal opinion control opens the door to a wealth of questions posing mathemat-
ical problems that are interesting in their own right. Moreover, these questions and also possible
answers trigger equally exciting challenges for their interpretations. After all, formally we are
investigating only an artificial society, and what we can learn from the results is no output of
mathematics – it has to be discussed very carefully.
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Appendix A. Exact Mathematical Models for Optimal Opinion Control
In this appendix, we present and briefly explain the detailed mathematical Mixed Integer
Linear Programming (MILP) models used in this paper. This should allow the interested reader
to replicate our results.
The chosen modeling technique is – not surprisingly – much more powerful in the DG-model
than in the BC-model; the former takes profit of the linear system dynamics whereas the latter
suffers a lot from the highly non-continuous system dynamics and the numerical instability. More
specifically, our model is not able to represent the original problem exactly. We will provide,
however, actually two models: one is correct in the sense that every upper bound on the objective
value of the model is an upper bound on the optimal number of convinced voters in the original
problem (but possibly not vice versa); the other one is correct in the sense that any feasible
solution to it is a feasible solution to the original problem (but possibly not vice versa).
The motivation for using integral variables in a model for our optimal control problem is that
the dynamics mainly depends on the structures of the confidence sets and the conviction sets:
We can use binary variables to indicate how the conviction sets and the confidence sets, resp.,
look like.
Since the BC-model requires some experience in modeling with MILPs, we start with a model
for the DG optimal control problem. Later on, when the main principles are explained, we will
present a model for the BC-model.
A.1. An MILP Model for the DG Optimal Control Problem. In this section we present
a mathematical model, a Mixed Integer Linear Programming model (MILP), for the solution of
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the DeGroot optimal opinion control problem. We start with the DeGroot dynamics in order
to explain some crucial MILP-modeling techniques in this easier dynamics. These techniques
will be used extensively for the bounded-confidence dynamics, in which the logic is considerably
more complicated.
The following MILP model is based on standard modeling techniques in (MILP). We first list
the variables of the model.
• The continuous variables xt0 ∈ [0, 1], t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 denote the positions in opinion
space where we place a control in the various stages; these are the variables that we are
really after.
• The continuous variables xti ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ I, t = 0, 1, . . . , N denote the positions of the
voters in the various stages; these variables measure the system states. The variables in
stage 0 are given as input data (start state / start value).
• For each voter, we want to measure whether its position in stageN is inside the conviction
interval; to this end, we use binary variables zi ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ I, with the following meaning:
zi = 1 if and only if i is convinced in stage N , i.e., x
N
i ∈ [`, r].
With this, we may formulate the goal of the model: we want to maximize the number of
convinced voters, which can be expressed as follows:
max
∑
i∈I
zi. (4)
Now, the success measuring variables zi have to be coupled with our decisions x
t
0 via the system
states and the system dynamics. The following linear side constraint couples the decisions to
the system states:
xt+1i =
∑
i∈I0
wijx
t
j for all i ∈ I, t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. (5)
So far, we did not restrict the binary variables. A solver would simply set them all to 1 and
achieve an objective value of n (all convinced), because the binary variables so far have nothing
to do with the underlying dynamical system.
The binary variables can now be coupled to the system state variables in stage N by a
standard MILP modeling trick as follows. The logical implication must be: If zi = 1, i.e., if
we want to count an voter as convinced, then ` ≤ xNi ≤ r must hold. In other words, the
inequalities ` ≤ xNi ≤ r can be violated when zi = 0, but they must be satisfied whenever
zi = 1. Thus, whether or not we demand the restriction ` ≤ xNi ≤ r depends on the value of
a variable. We call such a conditional restriction a variable-conditioned constraint and write it
as ` ≤ xNi ≤ r vif zi = 1. The MILP modeling trick can transform such a variable-conditioned
constraint into a set of unconditioned constraints in all cases where the violation of the variable-
conditioned constraint is bounded.
We show the transformation for the inequality ` ≤ xNi , the other inequality can be handled
analogously. The maximal violation of the inequality ` − xNi ≤ 0 is `, since ` − x ≤ ` for all
x ∈ [0, 1]. That means, the inequality ` − xNi ≤ ` does trivially hold, no matter where xNi is in
[0, 1]. We want to impose the trivial inequality `− xNi ≤ ` whenever zi = 0 and the non-trivial
inequality ` − xNi ≤ 0 whenever zi = 1. But this can be achieved in one step by imposing the
inequality
`− xNi ≤ `(1− zi) for all i ∈ I. (6)
The analogously derived inequality for the right border of the conviction interval reads
xNi − r ≤ (1− r)(1− zi) for all i ∈ I. (7)
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The complete MILP reads as follows:
max
∑
i∈I
zi (8)
subject to
xt+1i =
∑
i∈I0
wijx
t
j for all i ∈ I, t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, (9)
`− xNi ≤ `(1− zi) for all i ∈ I, (10)
xNi − r ≤ (1− r)(1− zi) for all i ∈ I, (11)
zi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ I, (12)
xti ∈ [0, 1] for all t = 0, 1, . . . , N , i ∈ I ∪ {0}. (13)
In the following we will not spell out anymore the results of such transformations. Instead,
we will present the variable-conditioned constraints literally in order to make the logic more
decipherable. The above MILP with literally expressed variable-conditioned constraints reads as
follows:
max
∑
i∈I
zi (14)
subject to
xt+1i =
∑
i∈I0
wijx
t
j for all i ∈ I, t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, (15)
vif zi = 1 (16)
` ≤ xNi ≤ r for all i ∈ I, (17)
end (18)
zi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ I, (19)
xti ∈ [0, 1] for all t = 0, 1, . . . , N , i ∈ I ∪ {0}. (20)
The reader should bear in mind that MILP models with additional variable-conditioned con-
straints with bounded violation can be transformed into true MILP models. Thus, such models
are accessible for standard MILP solvers like cplex (ILOG 2014). Modeling languages like zimpl
(Koch 2004) even support variable-conditioned constraints directly.
The MILP for the DG-model can be solved efficiently by of-the-shelf software like cplex. In
particular, solving our benchmark problem for any number of stages between 1 and 10 is possible.
For example, 11 convinced voters are possible with only one round for uniform weights, and this
does not even need the help of a control.
A.2. MILP Models for the BC Optimal Control Problem. The optimal control problem in
bounded-confidence dynamics is non-continuous, thus non-linear. Nevertheless, one can construct
an MILP model for it by using variable-conditioned constraints in a similar way as in the previous
section.
We introduce a real parameter ˆ (meant to be of small absolute value; in our computational
experiments we chose ˆ = ±10−5) with the following meaning: whenever j is not in the confidence
interval of i, then |xi−xj | ≥ +ˆ must hold. For ˆ > 0, this is stronger than the original condition,
which is: if j is not in the confidence interval of i, then |xi − xj | >  must hold, and vice versa.
This original condition is a strict inequality that can not be handled directly in MILPs, and
a transformation to a different MILP (in modified so-called homogeneous variables) is usually
numerically highly unstable.
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With the modified condition we can choose either to exclude potentially feasible solutions
(this happens for ˆ > 0) or to include potentially infeasible solutions (this happens for ˆ ≤ 0).
In the latter case, we grant the optimization algorithm to choose freely in particular whether or
not j is in the confidence interval of i whenever |xi − xj | = .
Thus, the model needs to be applied twice: for the identification of feasible solutions we need
to set ˆ to something strictly positive, and for the determination of upper bounds on the optimal
number of convinced voters we need to set ˆ to at most zero. The larger the absolute value of ˆ
is, the more robust the conclusions are against rounding errors.
If we run the model only once with, e.g., ˆ = 10−5 we allow for a small inaccuracy in the
upper bound obtained by the model. Such an inaccuracy can not be avoided when a standard
MILP-solver is used – the most powerful solvers like cplex (ILOG 2014), xpress, or gurobi use
bounded-precision floating point arithmetics, and an accuracy of 10−6 is a common setting. Any
solution that we miss this way, however, would be non-robust in the sense that a slight deviation
from the system dynamics would lead to a different objective.
There are several modeling options out of which we present two. The first model extends the
MILP for the DG-model using similar techniques to a much larger extent. We could solve it
by the standard MILP solver cplex up to N = 4 in less than an hour. For N = 5 the solver
could not even get close to a proven optimal solution in weeks. The second model is a carefully
engineered, more complicated system comprising some experience in MILP techniques. With the
second model we were able to solve the benchmark problem up to N = 6 with cplex.
We suspect that the solution for N = 7 and above requires tailor-made MILP models and
solution techniques.
For both our models, we assume that all voters are numbered according to their starting
opinion, i.e., i < j implies x0i ≤ x0j for i, j ∈ I. This saves some work since the order of voters in
the opinion space does never change, due to Lemma 4.1.
Our first, basic model uses the following variables:
• The control variables xt0, t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 model the opinions published by the con-
troller, as above. These are the only independent decision variables. The remaining
variables are dependent measurements to compute the objective function.
• The state variables xti, i ∈ I, t = 0, 1, . . . , N measure the opinions of agent i in stage t,
as above.
• The binary indicator variables vti,j are one if and only if voters i < j are within distance ,
i.e., they influence each other.
• The binary indicator variables lti , rti , and cti are one if and only if the control in stage t
is to the left by a margin of at least ˆ, strictly to the right by a margin of at least ˆ, or
inside the confidence interval of voter i.
• The binary indicator variables zi, i ∈ I, are one if and only if voter i is within the
conviction interval [`, r] in the final stage N , as above.
• The measurement variables x¯t0,i, i ∈ I, t = 0, 1, . . . , N , denote the contribution of the
control opinion xt0 in the system dynamics formula in stage t; this variable must equal
xt0 if the control is in the confidence interval of voter i; it must be zero otherwise.
• The measurement variables x¯tj,i, i, j ∈ I, t = 0, 1, . . . , N , denote the contribution of the
voter’s opinion xtj in the system dynamics formula of voter i in stage t; this variable must
equal xtj if that opinion is in the confidence interval of voter i; it must be zero otherwise.
• The count variables kti , i ∈ I, t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, denote the number of voters in the
confidence interval of voter i in stage t.
With this set-up and the aforementioned use of linearized variable-conditioned constraints,
we can formulate the following basic model. The logical details are explained right after the
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presentation of the MILP.
max
∑
i∈I
zi (21)
subject to
x0i = x
start
i ∀ i ∈ I, (22)
lti + r
t
i + c
t
i = 1 ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, i ∈ I, (23)
vif cti = 1 then
xt0 − xti ≤  (24)
xti − xt0 ≤  (25)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, i ∈ I,
vif rti = 1 then
xt0 − xti ≥ + ˆ (26)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, i ∈ I,
vif lti = 1 then
xti − xt0 ≥ + ˆ (27)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, i ∈ I,
vif vti = 1 then
xtj − xti ≤  (28)
else
xtj − xti ≥ + ˆ (29)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, i, j ∈ I : i < j,
kti =
∑
j∈I\{i}
vtmin(i,j),max(i,j) + 1 + c
t
i ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, i ∈ I, (30)
vif cti = 1 then
x¯t0,i = x
t
0 (31)
else
x¯t0,i = 0 (32)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, i ∈ I,
vif vtmin(i,j),max(i,j) = 1 then,
x¯tj,i = x
t
j (33)
else
x¯tj,i = 0 (34)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, i, j ∈ I : i 6= j,
vif kti = k then
xt+1i =
1
k
( ∑
j∈I\{i}
x¯tj,i + x
t
i + x¯
t
0,i
)
(35)
end ∀ k = 1, 2 . . . , |I|+ 1, t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, i ∈ I,
vif zi = 1 then
xNi ≥ ` (36)
xNi ≤ r (37)
end ∀ i ∈ I
vti,j , l
t
i , r
t
i , c
t
i, zi ∈ {0, 1} ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, i, j ∈ I : i < j, (38)
kti ∈ N ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, i ∈ I, (39)
xti ∈ [0, 1] ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N , i ∈ I ∪ {0}.. (40)
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The objective function (21) counts the number of voters in the conviction interval in stage N .
Restriction (22) sets the positions of the opinions in stage 0 to the given start values. Con-
straint (23) demands (together with the fact that all involved variables are binary) that exactly
one of the variables lti , r
t
i , c
t
i must be one. The meaning is that the control is either strictly to
the left, to the right, or inside the confidence interval of voter i in each stage t. With restrictions
(24) and (25) we request that whenever cti = 1 the distance between the control and voter i is
no more than  so that the control is really inside i’s confidence interval. In contrast to this,
inequalities (26) and (27) make sure that whenever rti = 1 resp. l
t
i = 1 the control must be to
the right resp. to the left with a distance of at least + ˆ from voter i so that the control is really
outside the i’s confidence interval. Restrictions (28) and (29) make sure in a similar way hat the
value vti,j correctly indicates whether or not i and j are in each others’ confidence intervals. The
case distinction between a large distance to the left or to the right is unnecessary because of the
order of all voters’ opinions, reflected by the indices, stays fixed throughout the process. Con-
straints (30) sets kti to the number of opinions in the confidence interval of voter i. Constraints
(31) and (32) compute how much the control’s opinion contributes to the next opinion of voter i.
This is either the control’s opinion in case cti = 1 or zero in case c
t
i = 0. Similarly, constraints
(33) and (34) compute the contribution of voter j to the next opinion of voter i depending on
the value of vtmin(i,j),max(i,j). Depending on how many opinions are in the confidence interval
of voter i, we can now compute its next opinion by restriction (35). Constraints (36) and (37)
make sure the classification in variable zi of being convinced is consistent with the distance of
i’s opinion to the conviction interval.
Our second, more sophisticated model uses the following variables:
• The control variables xt0, t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 are as above.
• Similarly, the state variables xti, i ∈ I, t = 0, 1, . . . , N are as above.
• For jmin, jmax ∈ I and cl, cr ∈ {0, 1}, we introduce variables vti,(jmin,jmax;cl,cr) where
vti,(jmin,jmax;cl,cr) = 1 if and only if the following holds: voter jmin is the minimal index of
a voter in the confidence interval of i, voter jmax is the maximal index of a voter in the
confidence interval of i, Index cl = 1 if and only if x
t
0 ≥ xti −  (i.e., the control is not to
the left of the confidence interval of voter i), and Index cr = 1 if and only if x
t
0 ≤ xti + 
(i.e., the control is not to the right of the confidence interval of voter i). In particular,
all variables vti,(jmin,jmax;0,0) must be zero. The motivation for these variables is that
they are indicating the unique combinatorial confidence configuration (jmin, jmax; cl, cr)
of a voter: If vti,(jmin,jmax;cl,cr) = 1 then we know by Lemma 4.1 that all voters j ∈ I
with jmin ≤ j ≤ jmax influence i and that the current control influences i if and only if
l = r = 1. In MILP language, these variables are assignment variables that assign to
each voter a unique combinatorial confidence configuration.
• For jmin, jmax ∈ I, we introduce variables p(jmin,jmax) where p(jmin,jmax) = 1 if and only
if the following holds: jmin is the minimal index of a voter in the conviction interval in
stage N , and jmax is the maximal index of a voter in the conviction interval in stage N .
The motivation for these variables is that they are indicating the unique combinatorial
conviction configuration (jmin, jmax) in the final stage: If p(jmin,jmax) = 1 then the number
of convinced voters in stage N is simply jmax − jmin + 1.
With the variables above, a logically consistent model can be formulated, which can solve the
benchmark instance up to N = 5. Some additional engineering effort was required in order to
help cplex (ILOG 2014) to obtain the optimal value for N = 6 as well. For this, we need the
following auxiliary variables.
• For each voter i ∈ I and each stage t = 1, . . . , N we introduce measurement variables
λti and ρ
t
i denoting the left and right distances of voter i to the conviction interval [`, r].
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The motivation for these variables is that they provide a continuous measurement for
how close we are to convince more voters in stage t+1. Thus, with these variables we can
perturb the objective function to reduce the dual degeneracy of the model, i.e., solutions
with identical original objective value up to stage t have distinct perturbed objective
values, hinting at which solution has better chances to improve in the later stages.
• For i, j ∈ I with i < j and t = 0, 1, . . . , N we introduce binary indicator variables uti,j
with the following meaning: uti,j = 1 if and only if in stage t the confidence interval of
voter j contains voter i. This is the case if and only if in stage t the confidence interval
of voter i contains voter j. The motivation for these variables is, first, to transfer the
above symmetry relation to a relation among combinatorial confidence configurations
and, second, that branching on these new additional variables leads to more balanced
subproblems than branching on the variables for the combinatorial confidence configu-
rations.
• In the same spirit, we introduce for i ∈ I and t = 0, 1, . . . , N binary indicator variables sti
with the following meaning: sti = 1 if and only if in stage t the control is in the confidence
interval of voter i. The motivation is again that a more balanced branching is possible.
The resulting model, presenting all variable-conditioned constraints literally as above, reads
as follows. Again, detailed explanations follow the presentation of the model.
max
∑
(jmin≤jmax)
(jmax − jmin + 1)p(jmin,jmax) (41)
+ 1− 1
N
·
N∑
t=1
1
`
· 1
n
·
∑
i∈I
λti −
1
N
·
N∑
t=1
1
1− r ·
1
n
·
∑
i∈I
ρti (42)
subject to
x0i = x
start
i ∀ i ∈ I, (43)∑
jmin≤i≤jmax
cl,cr∈{0,1}
vti,(jmin,jmax;cl,cr)
= 1 ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
i ∈ I, (44)
vif
∑
jmax≥i
cl,cr∈{0,1}
vti,(jmin,jmax;cl,cr)
= 1 then
xti − xtjmin ≤  (45)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
i ∈ I,
jmin ≤ i,
vif
∑
jmin≤i
cl,cr∈{0,1}
vti,(jmin,jmax;cl,cr)
= 1 then
xtjmax − xti ≤  (46)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
i ∈ I,
jmax ≥ i,
vif
∑
jmax≥i
cl,cr∈{0,1}
vti,(jmin,jmax;cl,cr)
= 1 then
xti − xtjmin−1 ≥ + ˆ (47)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
i ∈ I,
0 < jmin ≤ i,
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vif
∑
jmin≤i
cl,cr∈{0,1}
vti,(jmin,jmax;cl,cr)
= 1 then
xtjmax+1 − xti ≥ + ˆ (48)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
i ∈ I,
i ≤ jmax < n,
vif
∑
jmin≤i≤jmax
cr∈{0,1}
vti,(jmin,jmax;1,cr) = 1 then
xti − xt0 ≤  (49)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
i ∈ I,
vif
∑
jmin≤i≤jmax
cl∈{0,1}
vti,(jmin,jmax;cl,1)
= 1 then
xt0 − xti ≤  (50)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
i ∈ I,
vif
∑
jmin≤i≤jmax
cr∈{0,1}
vti,(jmin,jmax;0,cr) = 1 then
xti − xt0 ≥ + ˆ (51)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
i ∈ I,
vif
∑
jmin≤i≤jmax
cl∈{0,1}
vti,(jmin,jmax;cl,0)
= 1 then
xt0 − xti ≥ + ˆ (52)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
i ∈ I,∑
jmin≤jmax
p(jmin,jmax) ≤ 1 ∀ t = 1, . . . , N, (53)
vif
∑
jmax≥jmin
p(jmin,jmax) = 1 then
xtjmin ≥ ` (54)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
jmin ∈ I,
vif
∑
jmin≤jmax
p(jmin,jmax) = 1 then
xtjmin ≤ r (55)
end ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1,
jmax ∈ I,
vif vti,(jmin,jmax;cl,cr)
= 1 then
xti =
∑
j∈I:jmin≤j≤jmax
xt−1j + clcrx
t−1
0 (56)
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end ∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
i ∈ I,
jmin, jmax ∈ I : jmin ≤ jmax,
cl, cr ∈ {0, 1},
λti ≥ `− xti ∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
i ∈ I, (57)
λti ≥ 0 ∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
i ∈ I, (58)
ρti ≥ xti − r ∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
i ∈ I, (59)
ρti ≥ 0 ∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
i ∈ I, (60)
λti ≤ ` ∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
i ∈ I, (61)
ρti ≤ r ∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
i ∈ I, (62)
vif p(jmin,jmax) = 1 then
λNi ≤ 0 (63)
end i ∈ I : i ≥ jmin,
jmin, jmax ∈ I : jmin ≤ jmax,
vif p(jmin,jmax) = 1 then
ρNi ≤ 0 (64)
end i ∈ I : i ≤ jmax,
jmin, jmax ∈ I : jmin ≤ jmax,
uti,j =
∑
jmax≥j
jmin≤jmax
cl,cr∈{0,1}
vti,(jmin,jmax;cl,cr)
∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
i, j ∈ I : i < j, (65)
uti,j =
∑
jmin≤i
jmax≥jmin
cl,cr∈{0,1}
vtj,(jmin,jmax;cl,cr)
∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
i, j ∈ I : i < j, (66)
sti =
∑
jmin,jmax∈I :
jmin≤jmax
vtj,(jmin,jmax;1,1) ∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
i ∈ I, (67)
x00 ≤
1
2
(68)
xti − xt−1i ≤
n− i+ 1
n− i+ 2  ∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
i ∈ I, (69)
xti − xt−1i ≥ −
i
i+ 1
 ∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
i ∈ I, (70)
xti ≤ xtj ∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
i, j ∈ I : i < j, (71)
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xti ∈ [0, 1] ∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
i ∈ I (72)
vti,(jmin,jmax;cl,cr)
∈ {0, 1} ∀ t = 1, . . . , N,
jmin, i, jmax ∈ I : jmin ≤ i ≤ jmax,
cl, cr ∈ {0, 1}, (73)
p(jmin,jmax) ∈ {0, 1} jmin, jmax ∈ I : jmin ≤ i ≤ jmax.
(74)
The main term of the objective (41) determines the number of convinced voters by the help of the
variable p(jmin,jmax), which is one if and only if jmin is the minimal index and jmax is the maximal
index of a convinced voter. The perturbation (42) adds one and subtracts a penalty term less
than one from this number. The penalty is essentially the normalized average distance of the
non-convinced voters to the conviction interval. The motivation of this perturbation is, that
the standard solver, when branching on variables with increasing stage index, has a chance to
identify those partial solutions up to a stage that have greater chances (heuristically) to increase
the number of convinced voters in future stages. This influences which branches are inspected
first and can lead to faster identification of good primal solutions. Restriction (43) fixes the start
values, as in the basic model. Constraint (44) demands that exactly one confidence configuration
is selected for each voter in each stage. Constraints (45) through (52) makes sure that the
selection of confidence configurations is consistent with the opinions and their distances (in an
analogous way to the basic model). Constraint (53) models the fact that there can be at most one
conviction configuration at the end. If none of the possible conviction configurations is selected
then no voter is convinced in the end. Restrictions (54) and (55) make sure that the selected
conviction configuration is consistent with the distances of voters to the conviction interval. The
dynamics is represented by restriction (56). Note how much simpler the computation of the
dynamics becomes with the help of the confidence configuration variables compared to the basic
model. So far, the logic of bounded confidence control is complete. The remaining restrictions
are heuristic add-ons in order to accelerate the solutions process in a standard solver by means
of the additional variables. Contraints (57) through (64) impose bounds on the distances of
voters to the conviction interval. If we put them all together, the distance variables are urged
to exactly those distances. Constraint (65) and (66) make sure that the additional variables
uti,j receive values that are consistent with the selected confidence configurations: voters i and j
influence each other if and only if one of the confidence configuration variables vti,(jmin,jmax;cl,cr)
and vtj,(jmin,jmax;cl,cr), respectively, for configurations in which i and j influence each other is
one. The sum is taken over all such configurations, thus it does not matter which confidence
configuration variable contributes the one. Totally analogous is the effect of constraint (67) for
the additional variable sti: it is set to one whenever one of the confidence configuration variables
of the form vtj,(jmin,jmax;1,1) is one. Some additional cutting planes are provided by restriction (68),
which chooses the first control value in the left half of the opinion space. This is possible because
the benchmark problem is symmetric. Restrictions (69) and (70) pose bounds on how far an
opinion can move in just one stage. Finally, constraint (71) explicitly demands that the order of
opinions is consistent with the indices. The remaining constraints (72) through (74) specify the
types of the variables.
If one spells out all variable-conditioned constraints in linear restrictions, then one obtains
the problem class rocII contained in the MIPLIB 2010 (Koch et al. 2011) benchmark suite. The
instance rocII-4-11 (11 voters, 4 stages) is classified as “easy” whereas already rocII-7-11
is classified as “challenge” (open problem). The full benchmark problem rocII-10-11 (status
“challenge”) is also contained in the suite. The MIPLIB 2010 suite constitutes the probably most
important test bed used by virtually all developers of standard solvers for tuning their software
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products, and it may very well be that general MILP research that is totally unrelated to opinion
dynamics will lead to the solution of some of our benchmark instances.
Appendix B. The parameter settings for the MILP solver
simplex tolerance feasibility 1e-09
simplex tolerance optimality 1e-3
mip strategy variableselection 3 (=strong branching)
mip tolerance absmipgap 1e-3
emphasis numerical yes
timelimit 3600 (in the respective cases)
Table 11. The cplex parameter settings that were used for all computations.
Table 11 shows the cplex parameter setting that we used for our computations. This is meant
for possible replication of our results. There is no reason to believe that these parameter values
are the best possible. They have been set based on our general computational experience in
MILP.
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